Dear Paul
Thanks for such a thoughtful answer-your argument is quite
condensed so i might not have grasped it and will have spend some time
unpacking it all-just one exploratory question now though-how is it possible
to talk about an ontology of problems if there is a reversible zone of
indiscernability (necessary to stop absolute precision of composite?)
between actual and virtual-i don't think i have conflated the actual with
the real but am a little thrown by the conclusion to Cinema 2:
For the time image to be born, on the contrary, the actual image must
enter into relation with its own virtual image as such; from the outset
pure discription must divide in two, 'repeat itself, take itself up again,
fork, contradict iteslf. An image which is double-sided, mutual both actual
and virtual, must be constituted. We are no longer in the situation of a
relationship between the actual image image and other virtual images,
recollections, or dreams, which thus become actual in turn: this is still a
mode of linkage. We are in the situation of an actual image and its own
virtual image, to the extent that there is no longer any linkage of the real
with the imaginary, but indiscernaibility of the two Cinema 273
So in asking the question how can a problem be pre-actual-i am asking how it
can be specified within this zone of indiscernibality without replicating
the anticipatory grammatical problem of lacan's mirror stage-does saying
pre=actual put 'precociousness' into an established (tele-poetic) link
that always already qualifies the dramatic intensity- without the zone of
indiscernability the composite would close itself down in precision. so does
saying pre-actual specify pre-ontological, pre-existent....once when Alice
was crossing a river? these are just some first responses-i'll write again
when i have done your comments the justice of some more thought!
cheers Ruth.C
>>> Paul Bryant <levi_bryant@xxxxxxxxx> 01/08 3:51 am >>>
Hi Ruth--
You have asked a very difficult and complex question
and I'm not at all sure of how to answer it. The
pre-actual nature of problems does indeed describe the
moment of dramatic intensity that can be neither
qualified nor quantified in the process of
(indi)-different-ciation. Now, the question is, why
are problems virtual? How is it possible for a
problem to be pre-actual? In encountering this
question I'm led to wonder how the actual is being
understood. By the actual, do you mean the real? If
by actual you mean what is real, then I can fully
understand why the notion of the necessary virtuality
or pre-actuality of problems would appear strange.
However, for Deleuze, the virtual is not that which is
not real, but rather refers to differences in kind,
power, potential, etc.. According to Deleuze, "The
virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual.
_The virtual is fully real in so far as it is
virtual._ Exactly what Proust said of states of
resonance must be said of the virtual: 'Real without
being actual, ideal without being abstract'; and
symbolic without being fictional. Indeed the virtual
must be defined as strictly a part of the real
object-- as though the object had one part of itself
in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an
objective dimension... The reality of the virtual
consists of the differential elements and relations
along with the singular points which correspond to
them. The reality of the virtual is structure. We
must avoid giving the elements and relations which
form a structure an actuality which they do not have,
and withdrawing from them a reality which they have.
We have seen that a double process of reciprocal
determination and complete determination defined that
reality: far from being undetermined, the virtual is
completely determined" (DR, 208-9). This tells us
what the virtual is with respect to problems: Namely,
that the virtual consists of singular points and their
relations to one another that define a structure which
Deleuze calls a "problem" or an "idea".
However, while this passage might tell us what a
problem is, it does not tell us why Deleuze deploys
this notion, or what sort of work it's doing in his
thought. In using the term "Idea" Deleuze gives us a
tremendous clue for answering this question. For
Kant, ideas are generated by reason through the
illegitimate employment of the concepts of the
understanding. Now, what is peculiar in Kantian ideas
is that they always go beyond the scope of experience
despite the fact that what they try to represent can
never be found in experience. Thus, when reason tries
to generate an idea of the totality of the world, it
falls into antinomies because the totality of the
world is something that can never be brought before
experience. Because of this, it's possible to argue
that the world is finite or that the world is infinite
with equal validity, which would amount to a
"euthenasia" of reason. Now Kant wonders why reason
would be led to produce these sorts of illusions in a
nature that seems ordered by such effeciancy. His
answer is that these ideas represent problems that
lead the understanding to ever go beyond itself. Left
to its own devices, understanding would only know
things in a partial and disconnected way; however the
idea of the world as a total and unified system leads
the understanding to ever seek deeper into the nature
of the world and thus to constantly expand its
knowledge and understanding. A discussion of this can
be found in the opening pages "Ideas of Synthesis and
Difference" in _Difference and Repetition_.
Now, it's clear that Deleuze does not wish to use
Ideas or problems in this same way, but he does retain
the problematic status of ideas. We can understand
how Deleuze is putting the notion of Ideas to work by
a detour through Bergson. For Bergson as for Deleuze,
actual experience presents us with nothing but mixed
composites or numerical multiplicities that are
characterized by extension or spatiality and thus only
by differences in degree. The task of intuition and
philosophy is to determine the nature of these
composites in such a way that we determine the kinds
or singularities out of which they're composed. When
this is properly done we produce concepts that are so
accurate (in Bergson's and Deleuze's view) that they
are indiscernible from the things themselves. The
question to ask is what possible use such a concept
could have. If the concept is indistinguishable from
the composite that it analyzes, why produce a concept
at all rather than remaining with the things
themselves? It seems to me that there's only one
possible answer to this question. When dealing with
the actual there's a tendency to cover over true
differences and to try to construct composites out of
other composites. Thus we ask questions like "is
everything matter or are there two different types of
being composed of matter and mind" or we ask "is
everything nature or nurture," etc.. This is a
necessarily spatialized way of thinking that only
thinks in terms of numerical multiplicities that
contain their metric within themselves, rather than
changing in kind every time they're divided.
So far so good I hope. Now, to give an example, when
Bergson takes up the question of perception in _Matter
and Memory_ he argues that there's not a difference in
kind between matter and perception, but rather a
difference in degree between matter and perception.
Matter, according to Bergson, is composed of nothing
but images, while perception consists in the selection
of images for virtual action (hopefully you'll excuse
me for not giving the entire argument here). I think
Bergson's analysis here gives us an excellent example
of why problems are virtual. Within the field of my
perception which is a composite selection of images
for the sake of possible actions, I find nothing but
the images that I have selected themselves. All I
find in my perception is my perception; but what is
conspicuously absent from my perception is the
sufficient reason for that perception, the mechanism
by which the selection is made. It seems to me that
this is precisely what the ontology of problems and
questions answers. The conditions for the selection
of images as problem does not resemble the actualized
perception, nor is it simply a negative moment that
disappears with the solution (actual perception), but
is instead the differential field out of which the
selection is made. The case is similar with respect
to biological entities. At the level of the actual
organism all I find are parts related to one another
in a particular way. Not only do these parts share
relations of resemblance to other organisms, but I
cannot deduce from the parts alone what they're
function is. However, if I can determine the virtual
problem out of which the organism is actualized, a
structure that is always just as much environmental as
it is organistic, then I no longer view the organism
as a mere continuation in a series of resemblances
with other species, but as a specific adaptation to a
specific set of problems that may or may not be well
formulated.
Hopefully all of this makes some sense. I'm not
entirely satisfied with it, but it does seem to nod in
the right direction.
Best Regards,
Paul
> Dear Paul,
> Thanks thats very helpful- sorry to
> be stupid but would you
> mind explaining the bit about pre-actualised
> problems again-are we again
> dealing with this moment of dramatic intensitity
> which can neither be
> qualified or quatified in individuating schema?-i am
> quite confused about
> virtual/actual relations at the moment and not sure
> how a problem can be
> conceived of as pre-actiual .
>
> Ruth.C
> >>> Paul Bryant <levi_bryant@xxxxxxxxx> 01/06 4:45
> pm >>>
> Hi Ruth--
>
> > from a cultural-politico persective, larmarkism
> > seems to attribute just a
> > little too much intentional power to the
> individual
> > will- i have heard that
> > the theory is deeply discredited but i'm not quite
> > sure that i understand
> > quite how this has come about ( see Keith
> > Ansell_Pearson's Germinal Life for
> > a fuller discussion than i can give on this) me,
> i
> > don't completely rule
> > out the possibility of such singular creative
> > intervention but would also
> > want to see how the intervening 'individual' can
> be
> > understood in a sum of
> > relations ( even if s/he is understood as an
> oddity
> > in an aggregate)
>
> Perhaps the problem can be solved by distinguishing
> between "differences born by the individual" and
> "individual differences." Deleuze acknowledges that
> the individual precedes the species and is the
> condition for the evolution of species, but only in
> a
> very specific sense: "We invoke a field of
> individuation or individuating difference as the
> condition of the organisation and determination of
> species. However, this field of individuation
> isposited only formally and in general: it seems to
> be 'the same' for a given species,and to vary in
> intensity from one species to another. It seems,
> therefore to depend upon the species and the
> determination of species, and to refer us once more
> to
> differences borne by the individual, not to
> individual
> differences. In order for this difficulty to
> disappear, the individuating difference must not be
> conceived within a field of individuation in
> general,
> but must itself be conceived as an individual
> difference. The form of the field must be
> necessarily
> and in itself filled with individual differences.
> This plenitude must be immediate, thoroughly
> precocious
> and not delayed in the egg, to such a degree that
> the
> principle of indiscernibles would indeed have the
> formula given it by Lucretius: no two eggs or
> grains
> of wheat are identical" (DR, 252). In these terms
> Deleuze would indeed advocate a certain
> Lamarkianism,
> but not the Lamarkianism of an individual will
> bringing about transformations in its organism.
> Rather, instead it would be a Lamarkianism of
> pre-actualized problems or ideas composed of
> individual differences or singularities. In other
> words, the problem (in Deleuze's ontological sense)
> would be the virtual yet effecient agency of
> evolutionary change.
>
> Paul Bryant
> Department of Philosophy
> Loyola University of Chicago
>
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