David--
The issue is not one of getting rid of self *per se*,
but of overcoming a certain notion of self and way of
relating to self. The tradition of *reflective*
philosophy from Descartes down through a certain
tradition of phenomenology, in one way or another
understands self in terms of a full transparency to
self, with the ability to totalize the contents of its
consciousness. The most extreme form of this will to
mastery appears in Hegel, with his recuperation of all
differences within a heirarchial system through
contradiction. If this doesn't seem like a very
serious matter, one need only take a look at the
encyclopedia _Philosophy of Mind_ where Hegel applies
this methodology to geography and nationalities. In
another vein, problems of self can be seen to arise
with respect to the ego (as understood by
psychoanalysis) where ego as a structure of
identification stands at the root of group psychology
and fascist movements. If were not clear on what
notion of self is being contested, with the problems
that arise in terms of a certain self-conception, then
all these critiques will appear nonsensicle.
With that said, nearly everyone belonging to the
Western philosophical tradition (including Deleuze)
has understood that the self is not something we
simply have, but something that we must foster and
create within an essentially ethical sphere (cf.
Taylor _Sources of Self_ and Deleuze's _The Logic of
Sense_). The question, then, is one of how to go
about this fostering of self in such a way that we
avoid these horrors of self.
On the issue of trusting the self to root out its own
fascism, it seems to me that this is a variant of
meno's paradox: How is inquiry possible if learning
requires me to both know and not know that which I'm
seeking? It seems to me that this problem is neatly
dealt with if we understand learning to always take
place between two series constantly in exchange with
one another. The defascization of the self would be
something that occurs through the morphological
processes these series undergo in relation to one
another. While we might not yet fully know what it
would mean to think and feel without fascist desires,
we can at least move in the direction of escape from
those desires by progressively uncovering their causes
and seeking out what is active and affirmative within
us.
You say:
It seems it would
> be a delusion to think of there to be an "out," or
> that we could know it, given
> how it is being described to be "in." I do not see
> this possibility without
> linking these issues to the life span, which
> includes the developmental tasks, of
> individual human beings. Our past life, our
> experiences, our family, our culture,
> these all combined can explain the source of the
> problem and open a way out.
> Otherwise how do we describe this perpetual second
> by second fighting the self
> against the self.
It seems to me that your comments here are actually a
critique of the reflective self and the identificatory
ego. Both the reflective self and the identificatory
ego apprehend themselves as being fully transparent to
themselves and in fully control of the contents of
their consciousness (incidently, listening to my
students leads me to believe that this is also a sort
of spontaneous ideology of how we apprehend ourselves
in day to day life, as well... Hence it's not simply
a critique of Descartes and Freud, but something very
real in our socius). However, when we come to
understand ourselves as being "in" in the way you
describe, it becomes clear that the self isn't fully
present to itself, but rather the product of a "tain"
that allows the self to be reflected at all. As you
correctly note, this relation between condition and
conditioned, tain and reflected, being-in and
being-present-to-self, is the very thing that allows a
war within self to be possible, and which therefor
allows a critical relation towards self to be
effected.
In a similar way, Jurgen Habermas
> has also called on the
> importance of human development for creating
> societies that would avoid fascism,
> by creating selves that are capable of avoiding
> fascism in themselves. Fascism is
> described as a way of being as self. Not that I am
> convinced by all of Habermas'
> developmental solutions, but I think developmental
> solutions are the direction of
> the solution.
Habermas' communicative rationality strikes me as
being counterproductive towards these ends. It
appears to be based on a normalized notion of human
beings and their capacities that is, in point of fact,
one of the things that has lead to many of the horrors
of the last century. For when we seek to maintain
this normalized view of rationality, we find that we
must exercise violence (in both the literal and the
more systematic and discursive foucaultian sense) upon
bodies in order to make them conform to it.
Conversations are always about agreement... What do
we do with those that don't agree?
Best Regards,
Paul
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