A concept is to be no broader than the object out of which it arises, a sort
of plastic concept, hmm. It would probably be the Idea, insofar as there
are as many different actualisations (objects) as we want, but no baggy
clothes, the object fits around its Idea like... well, not like a glove,
that would be Kantian extrinsicism, more like skin. Of course Ideas aren't
concepts at all, that's tricky. "Out of which it arises"...Ideas are the
other way around, maybe Bergson's concepts are like extractions of the Idea
from its actualisations.
You're right to say that we're not talking about singular objects, though,
because there's no such thing. Singularities are only virtual, actualities
are distinctive.
: 0 Bobo
>I was wondering if anyone might have any comments on
>the nature of Bergsonian concepts. According to
>Bergson, a concept is to be no broader than the object
>out of which it arises. This also feeds into
>Deleuze's understanding of transcendental empiricism
>as describing the conditions of real rather than
>possible experience. The difficulty seems to be that
>a concept no broader than the object out of which it
>arises would seem to do little more than name the
>object and provide a definite description of it in the
>sense of Russell's definite descriptions. Such a
>concept would seem to be of little use. Already I
>open myself up to a Bergson style critique in that one
>of Bergson's major claims is that we go awry in our
>metaphysical thinking in that the intellect thinks in
>terms of what it can act upon, rather than the
>tendencies at work in the being. Thus, to claim that
>such a concept would be of little use also amounts to
>making a sort of pragmatic fallacy. However, it's
>notable that Bergson, in practice, seems to talk about
>general objects such a the nature of spirit or
>evolution, rather than singular objects. Perhaps,
>then, the problem is solved by claiming that when we
>tailor a concept to fit a particular object, we are
>not talking about singular objects, but kinds of
>objects. Since there is no concept of object so broad
>as to embody all possible kinds, this would make more
>sense of what it means to talk about the conditions of
>real experience rather than possible experience. The
>problem here is that this seems to bring us back to
>heirarchical relations of genus and species which both
>Bergson and Deleuze try to avoid.
>
>Paul
>
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