Paul/ My understanding was that "real" in deleuzian reading would include
possible as well as potential, that's why his "real" encompasses both
virtual and actual. Which by the way would correlate with Bergson's
notion of the memory of the future.
i may be wrong of course.
On Tue, 18 Apr 2000, Paul Bryant wrote:
> I was wondering if anyone might have any comments on
> the nature of Bergsonian concepts. According to
> Bergson, a concept is to be no broader than the object
> out of which it arises. This also feeds into
> Deleuze's understanding of transcendental empiricism
> as describing the conditions of real rather than
> possible experience. The difficulty seems to be that
> a concept no broader than the object out of which it
> arises would seem to do little more than name the
> object and provide a definite description of it in the
> sense of Russell's definite descriptions. Such a
> concept would seem to be of little use. Already I
> open myself up to a Bergson style critique in that one
> of Bergson's major claims is that we go awry in our
> metaphysical thinking in that the intellect thinks in
> terms of what it can act upon, rather than the
> tendencies at work in the being. Thus, to claim that
> such a concept would be of little use also amounts to
> making a sort of pragmatic fallacy. However, it's
> notable that Bergson, in practice, seems to talk about
> general objects such a the nature of spirit or
> evolution, rather than singular objects. Perhaps,
> then, the problem is solved by claiming that when we
> tailor a concept to fit a particular object, we are
> not talking about singular objects, but kinds of
> objects. Since there is no concept of object so broad
> as to embody all possible kinds, this would make more
> sense of what it means to talk about the conditions of
> real experience rather than possible experience. The
> problem here is that this seems to bring us back to
> heirarchical relations of genus and species which both
> Bergson and Deleuze try to avoid.
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Send online invitations with Yahoo! Invites.