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From: "daniel haines" <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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Date: Mon, 22 May 2000 12:38:46 +0100
hi asher,
> It seems that the point is not that there is no subject, but that there is
> no _stable_ subject -- meaning there is potential for action (agency) but
> that that agency is defined/influenced/constituted by power (in terms of
> Foucault). In the same sense, it seems that the revolution (or at least
the
> resistance) comes in part in terms of self-formation -- establishing the
> individual subject in terms of the self rather than in terms of
identity --
> in order to create revolutionary agency.
sorry if i gave the impression that i thought anyone was saying the was no
subject -- clearly that is not so, rather, as you say, it is the
stability--and, therefore, the sovereignty--of the subject which is
challenged.
i'm intrigued by your distinction between "subject" and "self"... i can see
it's psychoanalytic heritage (conscious subject/unconscious self) but i
would see the subject as the only possible locus for agency within that
framework? personally, i wouldn't even want to go that far (and posit an
unconscious self) ... but i assume (perhaps wrongly?) that your
differentiation of these terms rests on the idea of the unconscious as a
kind of true self [even if it is a libidinal materialist one!] as opposed to
a false subjectivity? and that while the subject submits to the authority
of the reality principle, the wild and free unconscious kow-tows to no one,
i.e. is revolutionary?! i realise i'm simplifying and collapsing different
discourses here, but, as i asked Sid Littlefield in my last post, doesn't
this kind of schema fall into a Romanticism of the self/subject??
and, lastly, if you take away this self/subject distinction, who is left to
'produce their own subjectivity' in a revolutionary action, so to speak?
dan h2o.