Presumably the point is "not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but
to find the conditions under which something new is produced (creativeness)";
these conditions may not be eternal or universal in a transcendent sense, but
they have some consistency throughout history, a consistency at least partly
defined by the way it acts against the historical in the watered-down sense
("resistance to the present", "the untimely"). The most fundamental recurring
features of the ontology of these conditions present themselves with different
degrees of force.
There is probably some irony in Deleuze talking about a "tradition" of
immanence; the whole idea of a perennial philosophy seems to be connected with
transcendence, isn't it? But for the reasons I've just talked about, it partly
takes the form of a tradition, a "hegemonic narrative." But Deleuze would
hardly make the same claims about his reading of the history of philosophy that
Hegel would. A tradition with which one could read Scotus into D.H. Lawrence
subverts scholasticism more than it imposes categorical boundaries on vitalist
literature, I think.
In message <37D1B8480D17D611B00800D0B7B86065092064@MAINSERVER> deleuze-guattari@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> but- isnt it strange that Deleuze is "writing" again the hegemonic narative
> unlike what he sould do - showing mainly how Scotus anticipated Spinoza and
> -----Original Message-----
> From: William Wood [mailto:william.wood@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2003 12:17 PM
> To: deleuze-guattari@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Scotus
> In the section on difference in itself in "Difference and Repetition",
> describes the 3 crucial stages in the univocity of Being; the first is Duns
> Scotus' Opus Oxionense, "the greatest book of pure ontology" I think he
> it, the second is Spinoza's Ethics, the 3rd is Nietzsche's eternal
> Deleuze characterises the three stages by saying that in Scotus univocity
> remains purely formal or void of content, in Spinoza univocity is affirmed
> substance but still retains the distinction between substance and mode and
> thus does not achieve the final radicality it achieves in Nietzsche.
> goes from being formal to being material and finally to its materiality
> determined in a way entirely uncompromised by transcendence.
> So you might say there aren't Scotist elements in Spinoza, but then you'd
> to qualify it by saying there are Spinozist anticipations in Scotus, and
> would just be argumentative...
> In message <F742uT6335DxnDzMcC600004f14@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> deleuze-guattari@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> > but this is not true. duns scott erigen is argumentative old guy from
> > ages.but your report is very adequate to the book of deleuze.
> > >
> > >Scotus is mentioned throughout the first two sections of Expressionism in
> > >Philosophy: Spinoza. Deleuze suggests that there are Scotist aspects of
> > >spinoza.
> > >
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