Re: Deleuze and Phenomenology

I have nothing to further contribute to Alexander's valuable comments except
to say that Kant does not recognise that there are mind independent aspects
of being/becoming that are not changed by being represented.

External relations have this capacity.

He cannot allow for an order of being attained in knowledge according to an
exercise of existence to which the mind in knowing it contributes nothing. 

He does not understand the being/becoming of relations.

By insisting that it is representation that makes the object possible Kant
gives precedence to the object's manifestation to the knower over the sign's
substitution. For kant representation is prior to signification. Only in
this way can Kant say that "representation is a priori determinant of the
object."
Kant denies that there are mind indep. aspects of being that can be known
_as they are_.
He does not see that there is an aspect of being that is indifferent to
being known or not known.
He assumes (like all modern phil.) that ideas represent themselves, ie. our
ideas are in the first place objects rather than signs (which have a being
towards something other than themselves). It is this 'being towards' or
'_relation_ of alterity' that is crucial.  

Paul.
in the middle and certainly never finishing.