Re: on the matter of mind

Melissa, i do not think i tried to subordinate sensibility to an
'identical subject'. Conceptual and identity change are simply not
problems for empiricism. As you pointed out the sensation creates the
subject, not the reverse. The old problem of how to account fro the
retrieval of information outside of an intentional, subsisting
subject is no longer a problem for empiricism either. As Bergson
pointed to, and as Deleuze remarks in his book on Bergson and in
the volumes on Cinema, information is stored in brain-like networks
in the global pattern of their force. A line of actualization
activates the resembling information in corresponding dimensions
of phase space by virtue of the particular line-fold's compositional
makeup. Subjectivity is coextensive with empiricism as such. Experience
does not need to be 'categorized'. I guess this would be my 'critique'
of Deleuze: he maintains Kantian 'schemata' that really only hinder
the understanding of his work. 

I would thus argue that there is an underlying resemblance that is the
possibility of experience. Not because it has to be in order for
experience to be possible as such, but rather because the resemblance
is ontological and therefore coextensive with what Deleuze hase 
referred to as the "One-All." The resembling thing is precisely what
Being is, and what most sciences call 'energy.'

Chris

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