Re: Re[5]: embodied mind

I myself have much more respect for Quine than i do for Wittgenstein.
Quine really doesn't work out of Witt. as much as he does Hume, Carnap,
Hempel, Neuarth, Sellars. Quine rejects not only the deductivo-proposition-
al model, but he's very critical of the 'sentential' associated with
Witt. A 'naturalized' epistemology cannot stop at language games. This is
reinforced by our reflection on the cognition of animals, who do not 
have 'language', either in external speech or a syntactical system, but
many of which engage in sophisticated cognition. Quine does develop
a theory, but it is very performative. It is a theory whose important
factors reside at the level of performance and activation, shall we
say, repetition, not propositions. Thus Quine believes the explanatory
power of theoretical principles to be different instances of, and there-
fore immanent to, perceptual recognition. This, however, is what i get
of Quine after going through Churchland. I really think this is close
to Deleuze.

Chris

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