RE: Heidegger's presuppositions

> Anthony,
> 1st, of course, we don't know "for sure" that this keyboard i'm using, or, say, 
> that cardboard box over there has the same being as us.  for that matter, we 
> don't know "for sure" that you and i have the same being.  and, to add a little 
> more grey to the picture, we don't know what kind of being other animals 
> have.  or that  we don't have the kind of reality these things have, heh, heh, 
> heh.

But all that follows from this is I and, for example, my keyboard 
are different beings.  It does not follow from this that one is not 
objectively present-in-the-world.  At this point, both could very 
well be present-at-hand.  It is the assumption that Dasein's essence 
is existence which, Heidegger says, determines one as specifically 
NOT present-at-hand.  And it is this assumption which I do not find 
as obvious as the phenomena which you list above.  Now, Heidegger 
says (at the beginning of SuZ 42) that the priority of existence over 
essence is a consequence of the comportment of Dasein's Being in 
understanding.  So I am trying to figure out why this must indeed be 
a consequence, since first of all, I myself don't see why it must be 
consequence, and second, Aristotle and Aquinas also held that 
understanding (and consciousness of beings in general) requires a 
comportment of Dasein's very being, but they did not feel it 
necessary to conclude from this that Dasein's essence is existence.  
Rather, they took Dasein's essence to be something present-at-hand 
(the soul).

>  i'd like to suggest that the entire text of B&T is a demonstration of the 
> existence (in time) of Dasein.  and i'd like to suggest that the traditional view 
> which prioritizes a theoretical understanding of existence cannot take us the 
> places that heidegger's  practical phenomonological analysis of everydayness  
> does.  heidegger gives us glimmers about time (about being temporal beings in 
> our ordinary everyday way of schmucking around); heidegger gives us 
> glimmers about the world (there is something really interchangeable about the 
> meaning of dasein and the meaning of being-in-the -world; and heidegger 
> gives us glimmers about the truth (fascist or otherwise)  ((i'll probably regret 
> saying this when the nursery responds)) that it has alot to do with our 
> judgements and decisions.  all of this provides a much better approach to 
> human existence/understanding/experience than do the traditional, 
> theoretical models.

I have no disagreements with you here.

> for heidegger to suggest that practical skills (caring & coping)  is the primary 
> understanding of the world and the beings in the world,  is not a new jumping 
> off place -- certainly James and others were saying the same things about the 
> same time.  

Well, it is new in the sense that Heidegger tries not to consider 
care and coping from the point of view of presence-at-hand AT ALL.  
As far as I can tell, he is the first to really consistently do this. 
 Other thinkers still tacitly harbor tinges of 'presence-at-hand' 
philosophy in their description of care and coping - ie, they still 
tacitly assume that presence-at-hand is primordial, which is really 
to not essentially break with 'presence-at-hand' philosophy.  So, I 
think Heidegger is the first thinker to REALLY know what it means to 
break with 'presence-at-hand' philosophy.  Now, as Derrida points 
out, this does not necessarily mean that he breaks with THE 
TRADITION.

> now that i've drooled all over this post, i've forgotten your question.  if you 
> have a derridian attack on heidegger as still part of the tradition, i say "ok, so 
> what?"  

Well, it at least opens up the door to seeing precisely what form a 
dialogue between Heidegger and a traditional thinker (or analytic 
philosophy in general, for that matter) would have to be take.
Bascially, in order to question Heidegger, one has to go back to the 
assertion that the comportment of Dasein's Being in understanding 
implies that Dasein's essence is existence.  Only in this way can one 
avoid the accusation that one is taking presence-at-hand as 
primordial, since Heidegger's assertion that presence-at-hand is not 
primordial presupposes that Dasein's essence is existence, which 
presupposes that this is a consequence of the comportment of Dasein's 
Being in understanding.

Anthony Crifasi


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