Malcolm Riddoch wrote:
>You have argued for a long time that concernful circumspection does
>not involve either perception or presence as in Crifasi c.1998:
>
> [Michael E] As Anthony Crifasi rightly points out, the besorgende
>Umsicht (concernful circumspection; this is a horrible translation,
>since what is meant is the encompassing view that guides Dasein in its
>daily taking care of things) is non-sensual.
>
> Heidegger means pre-THING sight. That means that the sight to which
>Heidegger is referring is pre-perceptual,
>since perceptual sight is the seeing of an occurring thing.
>
> You are still interpreting "thematically" only in terms of
> explicit thought. But what Heidegger says is that it is "not grasped
>thematically AS AN OCCURING THING." The words I have capitalized
>indicate that by "thematically" he means more than just explicit
>thought, since perception also grasps beings as occuring things, as
>Husserl himself points out. Therefore, the sight to which he is
>referring is pre-perception.
>
> It's not that we can't say that we perceptually "see" during
>practical "activities." Rather, the very possibility of saying that we
>"perceptually saw" during practical comportment presupposes
>pre-perceptual "sight" - concernful circumspection
>
> Heidegger opposes readiness-to-hand to PRESENCE-at-hand, so that a
>being is not PRESENT to circumspection. So since presence includes not
>merely "explicit thought," but also what you (and Husserl) call
>perception, then by non-thematic Heidegger means pre-perception.
>
>
>Now on one hand I agree with you and I've also said this all along, if
>we understand 'sight' in the sense that a thing is taken out of its
>work context and understood as merely present at hand, as an object in
>itself, then that is a problem from an existential phenomenological
>perspective.
1. Consider when an empiricist refers to "pure sensation," the sheer seing
of red or blue, prior to any thematic consideration of that red as a
property in an object or an idea in a subject. That red is therefore not "an
object in itself," as you have been using this phrase.
2. Yet, that red is not being used or in the *background* ready for use,
since it is *explicitly* seen in this sensation.
Therefore, sheer sensory perception also falls under what Heidegger calls
presence-at-hand. This is a strong objection against your interpretation,
according to which the "present-at-hand" must be an "object in itself" in
the sense you mean.
As for denying any "sight" in circumspection, look at the quotes from my
posts which you cite above. I mention "pre-perceptual sight" many times.
When I deny that "concernful circumspection" is sight, I mean sight in the
way YOU mean. In other words, someone who THINKS that the sight of
circumspection is the sight of bodily presence will naturally THINK that
someone who denies this is therefore denying that there is any kind of view
AT ALL in concernful circumspection. "Encompassing view," as Michael words
it, is a much better description.
Anthony Crifasi
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