Re: Zollikon: Unconscious

So Hen...when you say that, "It is interesting also how metaphorical meaning
and literal meaning flow into and out of each other temporally/historically.
A metaphor can give birth to
a literal meaning and indeed "become" literal." How is it that your are not
explicitly identifying the division between an existing "metaphorical
meaning" that flows into and out of a "literal meaning?" If there is no
metaphorical or literal meaning... how is there anything of the sort to flow
into or out of anything??

Well, Michael, I guess I am tracing a distinction that is interpretable in 
the way language is working in a given culture/epoch; it's a way of doing 
etymology, it is away of deconstructing usage, of monsterizing language and 
of thought. 


And when you say that Recoeur's work was "...very helpful to open up thought
about language and
metaphor, though he typically created a framework around the dynamic of
metaphor in grammar." What was it that he opened up thought about, if not
the subject of metaphor? And how is it that your saying that this line of
thinking was "helpful" is not a vote for the division?

For Ricoeur, finally, language is "grounded" (groundlessly) on the activity 
of the metaphor. On a certain level of description, as I remember it, Ricoeur 
wants to suggest that the dynamic "interpretation all the way down," is the 
mystery of language, and is the essence of metaphor.

And when you say that Paul Recoeur had an, "...almost mechanized explanation
of the dependence of language on metaphor." How is this not acknowledging
the proposition of metaphor...even to the extent that language depends upon
metaphor as much as, "physical human life depends
on oxygen."? Sounds pretty clear.


Ricoeur wanted explanation, apparatus, scientized phenomenological methods. 
Thus, I think, he used a Kantian frame for his meanderings on Heidegger's 
thinking about ontological hermeneutics. Still and yet, it was helpful to 
study that, to understand the limitations of that approach. I suppose I'm 
just saying I believe I am on the Heidegger side and not the Kant side of 
Ricoeur's scheme.

And when you refer to "this ability of metaphor and literal meanings to move
from one side of that metaphysical line to the other," and that this
movement, "reveals the mystery, undisclosedness of Being." How is it that
you can then say that you are not implicitly or explicitly assuming the
existence of metaphor?

This question corrolates with the first one: not that metaphor "exists."
Certainly the distinction exists, but as Michael E has stated, the 
distinction has become both shabbily utilized, and a reversal of the 
metaphysical tradition from Plato.

Am I making sense? Should I want to?

Kindest regards,
Henry


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