Re: Zollikon: Unconscious

>So Hen...when you say that, "It is interesting also how metaphorical meaning
>and literal meaning flow into and out of each other temporally/historically.
>A metaphor can give birth to
>a literal meaning and indeed "become" literal." How is it that your are not
>explicitly identifying the division between an existing "metaphorical
>meaning" that flows into and out of a "literal meaning?" If there is no
>metaphorical or literal meaning... how is there anything of the sort to flow
>into or out of anything??
>
>Well, Michael, I guess I am tracing a distinction that is interpretable in
>the way language is working in a given culture/epoch; it's a way of doing
>etymology, it is away of deconstructing usage, of monsterizing language and
>of thought.
>
>
>And when you say that Recoeur's work was "...very helpful to open up thought
>about language and
>metaphor, though he typically created a framework around the dynamic of
>metaphor in grammar." What was it that he opened up thought about, if not
>the subject of metaphor? And how is it that your saying that this line of
>thinking was "helpful" is not a vote for the division?
>
>For Ricoeur, finally, language is "grounded" (groundlessly) on the activity
>of the metaphor. On a certain level of description, as I remember it, Ricoeur
>wants to suggest that the dynamic "interpretation all the way down," is the
>mystery of language, and is the essence of metaphor.
>
>And when you say that Paul Recoeur had an, "...almost mechanized explanation
>of the dependence of language on metaphor." How is this not acknowledging
>the proposition of metaphor...even to the extent that language depends upon
>metaphor as much as, "physical human life depends
>on oxygen."? Sounds pretty clear.
>
>
>Ricoeur wanted explanation, apparatus, scientized phenomenological methods.
>Thus, I think, he used a Kantian frame for his meanderings on Heidegger's
>thinking about ontological hermeneutics. Still and yet, it was helpful to
>study that, to understand the limitations of that approach. I suppose I'm
>just saying I believe I am on the Heidegger side and not the Kant side of
>Ricoeur's scheme.
>
>And when you refer to "this ability of metaphor and literal meanings to move
>from one side of that metaphysical line to the other," and that this
>movement, "reveals the mystery, undisclosedness of Being." How is it that
>you can then say that you are not implicitly or explicitly assuming the
>existence of metaphor?
>
>This question corrolates with the first one: not that metaphor "exists."
>Certainly the distinction exists, but as Michael E has stated, the
>distinction has become both shabbily utilized, and a reversal of the
>metaphysical tradition from Plato.
>
>Am I making sense? Should I want to?


Ah, "making" sense - one of my favorite metaphors, partaking of a specie
which can't literally be "made" cause 'in a sense' (or at least in one
sense) (n w/literal pro.creation aside) no "one" can 'make' any of the real
senses.

And this is for me one of the better tuned threads to appear here for a
long time, keep it rollin y'all.

n please check (or chuck) in one of your sweeter toned quarter notes
somewheres on it Rene.

re-regards all,
kenneth

>Kindest regards,
>Henry



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