Michael Eldred wrote:
> > My argument was
> > not with your statement that physics investigates self-moving beings
>"with
> > regard to this self-movement" (#2 above), but your statement that it
> > investigates "self-moving beings IN THEIR BEING" (#3 above). THAT is
>what
> > overlaps with first philosophy as the investigation of being qua being
>in
> > general (which includes the being of self-moving beings).
>
>No Chinese walls, but permeable membranes.
>"which includes the being of self-moving beings" qua beings, whereas
>physics
>investigates specifically the being of movement -- with interpermeation.
By "the being of movement" do you mean movement insofar as it is a kind of
being?
> > geometry and astronomy do not overlap with mathematics in general -
> > for example:
> >
> > "Now as regards the number of locomotions, this should be the concern of
>the
> > mathematical science which is closest to philosophy, and this is
>astronomy;
> > for it is this science which is concerned with the investigation of
>sensible
> > but eternal beings, while the others, such as arithmetic and geometry,
>are
> > not concerned with any beings."
>
>No number (_arithmos_) or quantity (_megethos_) or continuity (_synechaes_)
>etc.
>appear in geometry and astronomy??
Yes, but astronomy treats those insofar as they are in physical beings,
whereas mathematics does not. That is why they do not overlap - one treats
those qua physical, and the other does not. Hence he says above that
arithmetic and geometry are not concerned with any beings whereas astronomy
is. Similarly, both physics and first philosophy include physical beings,
but physics investigates them qua in motion and not qua being, whereas first
philosophy investigates them purely qua being. That is why they do not
overlap even though they both include physical beings and motion - they
investigate these in specifically different aspects.
>The passage you cite is no support for your
>claim of Chinese walls existing between the divisions.
>
>You need to learn to look at phenomena and not primarily at passages which
>ostensibly "explicitly state" this or that. With the Crifasian "explicitly
>state" all you get is a very simple-minded philology. The concentration on
>texts
>makes you a scholar. Others (like Rene) rely on their chosen thinker for
>authority, which provides them with a worldview. But trying to get the
>phenomena
>into view is where philosophical questioning starts.
Getting the phenomena into view does not necessarily mean getting them into
view as Aristotle saw them. I thought we were specifically discussing the
latter.
> > But it would then be nothing other than physics itself. Aristotle
> > explicitly says that if there were no immovable beings,
> > then the first science would actually be physics.
>
>That must be Crifasian logic.
"if there were no beings other than those formed by nature, physics would be
the first science" (1026a29).
"If, then, natural beings are the first of beings, physics will be the first
of the sciences" (1064b11).
Not Crifasian; Aristotelian.
> > AC: The only point I was making is that there has to be at least some
>being
> > which is immovable if the first science is to be anything other than
> > physics. Whether there is only one such being or fifty-five does not
>matter.
> > All that matters is that Aristotle answers the "if" in the affirmative,
>so
> > that according to his hypothetical, the first science must then be other
> > than physics.
>
>Aristotle's idea of an unmoving mover as pure energy is cute.
Only ontic beings can be cute.
Anthony Crifasi
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