> But you didn't address my other questions?
My viewpoint of Marx, which I associate with others (Nietzsche, J.S.
Mill, Adam Smith) is a direct consequence of the few pages in
Heidegger's _Introduction in Metaphysics_ (chapter 4.D, the paragraph
57, named "Obligatorily as opposite of the to be, starting with the
moment the to be is defined as Idea. The formation and the fulfilling of
this opposition. Value philosophy"), and the few lines in _Being and
"We can't quite expect that the 'validity', seen as 'ideal Being', that
it would distinguish itself through a distinct ontological clarity.
Then, validity means at the same time the validity of the valuing
meaning of the judgment that rapports its judged 'object', sending thus
to *'objective value'* and objectuality in general. The meaning -- which
'values' a being and, in itself, values 'extra-temporarily' -- has still
another 'value': that it has validity *for* anyone who judges
rationally. This way, value means *mandatory character* and 'general
validity'. If, btw, one pleads for a 'critical' theory of knowledge
according to which the subjects 'does not get out of itself' [in order
to get] 'properly-said' to object, then the validity, -- as value of the
object, as objectivity -- is based on the stability, valid [in itself]
of a true meaning (!). The above three meanings of 'value', respectively
those of modality of being of the ideal, of objectivity and mandatory
character, they are themselves lacking clarity, the confusion growing by
straying on the level of their always changing appearance.
Methodological prudence requires us to avoid choosing as red wire such
fluctuant concepts." Cf. _Sein und Zeit_, Tubingen 1977, apud _Fiinta si
timp_, Bucharest 1994. (H's punctuation)
Become what you are!
(cf. Martin Heidegger's _Being and Time_, § 31, and Friedrich
Nietzsche's subtitle to _Ecce Homo_)
Tudor Georgescu (no, not "become *me*", silly! :-) )
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