John Foster wrote:
>Anyway, my assessment is that H has suggested that anxiety
>ramifies inidividual existence (Dasein).
By WITHDRAWING from individual existents, which refutes your interpretation.
>He refers to
>'anxiety [as] fear' and anxiety is at one time 'a state of
>mind' as well later as 'a mode of state of mind'.
John, I have twice now posted the following text concerning Heidegger's
explicit distinction between fear and anxiety, and you have twice refused to
address. Address it now please, along with my comment from TWO EXCHANGES
AGO:
First of all, "fear is anxiety, fallen into the world" - that is PRECISELY
the difference between fear and anxiety:
"In falling, Dasein turns away from ITSELF. That in the face of which it
thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of
threatening; YET THIS ENTITY HAS THE SAME KIND OF BEING AS THE ONE THAT
SHRINKS BACK; IT IS DASEIN ITSELF. That in the face of which it thus shrinks
back CANNOT BE TAKEN AS SOMETHING FEARSOME, for anything fearsome IS ALWAYS
ENCOUNTERED AS AN ENTITY-WITHIN-THE-WORLD. The only threatening which can be
fearsome and whcih gets discovered in fear always comes from entities
within-the-world. Thus the turning-away of falling is NOT a fleeing that is
founded upon a fear of entities within-the-world.... The turning away of
falling is grounded rather in ANXIETY, which in turn is what first makes
fear possible." (SuZ 185-186)
So the difference between fear and anxiety is precisely that fear shrinks
back from some entity within-the-world, whereas the turning-away of falling
is NOT from some entity-within-the-world, but rather from the very "same
kind of being as the one that shrinks back: IT IS DASEIN ITSELF." Since
Dasein is not an entity within the world, the turning-away from itself that
is falling cannot be fear, since fear is only of entities within-the-world.
That is what he means when he says that fear is anxiety fallen into the
world - anxiety, like fear, is a turning-away or shrinking back, but unlike
fear, it is not about an entity in the world at all.
>I also
>believe that there are 'grammatically ambiguous wordings' in
>his BT text (see footnote 1, page 187).
>
>There is a grammatical distinction between anxiety and being
>anxious:
>
>"That about which anxiety is anxious reveals itself as that
>in the face of which it is anxious - namely,
>Being-in-the-world." [BT 188] Anxiety is not here a
>'feeling' but a primordial condition of being, whereas being
>anxious is a feeling, a physiological one.
Where EXACTLY are you getting this grammatical distinction from? Exactly
line please.
>Then in the next paragraph we are told that anxiety is
>'disclosive' and that "a state of mind makes manifest how
>one is. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny' <Befindlichkeit>."
>Being-in-the-world therefore is a feeling too, it is a
>feeling of 'being at home'
Do you have any idea how utterly absurd it is to characterize
being-in-the-world as a feeling? You are like a dog with a bone - as soon as
you see some word that has a usual ontic meaning, like "feeling," you don't
even consider that in an ontological analytic, he just might be using the
term in a non-ontic sense. You probably interpreted discourse, call,
conscience, and falling in precisely the same way. YES he says that we
"feel" uncanny, but look at his EXPLANATION of uncanniness:
"If we interpret Dasein's uncanniness from an existential-ontological point
of view as a threat which reaches Dasein itself and which comes from Dasein
itself, we aer not contending that in FACTICAL anxiety too it has always
been understood in this sense. When Dasein "understands" uncanniness in the
everyday manner [which is what you are doing, John), it does so by turning
away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the not-at-home gets dimmed
down. Yet the everydayness of this feeling shows phenomenally that anxiety,
as a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasein's essential state of
Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is existential, IS NEVER
PRESENT-AT-HAND but is itself always in a MODE of factical Being-there -
that is, IN THE MODE OF A STATE-OF-MIND. That kind of Being-in-the-world
which is tranquilized and familiar is a MODE OF DASEIN'S UNCANNINESS, NOT
THE REVERSE. From an existential-ontological point of view, the not-at-home
must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon." (SuZ 189)
Just look at what he says here John! The "familiar is a mode of Dasein's
uncanniness, NOT THE REVERSE"! And yet you keep doing precisely the reverse,
interpreting uncanniness as a mode of the familiar - as a feeling! A
state-of-mind is not a feeling! You cannot just robotically read terms like
feelings, discourse, call, conscience, anxiety, state-of-mind, care with the
usual everyday meanings in Heidegger's analytic!
>"Uncanniness also means 'not-being-at-home'" [BT 188]
>
>"Being-in was defined as 'residing alongside...',
>'Being-familiar with..." which concretely is brought to view
>'through everyday publicness of the 'they', which
>tranquillized self-assurance...."
>
>and
>
>"On the other hand, as Dasein falls (but not collapses -
>falling is not a collapse but a 'lowering' emphatically and
>in a relational sense),
What the hell is that parenthetical remark supposed to mean John? The
falling of Dasein is the OPPOSITE of the collapse of facticity in anxiety!
The falling of Dasein means that Dasein constantly falls INTO facticity AWAY
FROM its authentic pure potentiality for being. The collapse refers to the
collapse OF FACTICITY (i.e., the OPPOSITE of falling) and going BACK to its
authentic pure potentiality for being. Your reading of the above passage is
completely twisted!
>anxiety brings it back from its
>absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses
>(this is the only useage of the word collapse I have found).
You must have missed the use of the word just two pages earlier:
"Here the TOTALITY of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the
present-at-hand discovered within-the-world is, as such, of NO consequence;
it COLLAPSES into itself; the world has the character of COMPLETELY lacking
significance." (SuZ 186)
Sorry John, it's a total collapse of facticity. Face it.
>Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as
>Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the *existential
>'mode'* of the 'not-at-home'. Nothing else is meant by our
>talk about 'uncanniness'". [BT 189]
>
>Here the ontical term 'familiarity' is used as a descriptive
>term meaning 'at-home' and the ontological meaning of
>anxiety, the 'uncanny' is interpretive regarding the
>individualized Dasein being felt as the 'uncanny' due to a
>'collapse of familiarity'.
"Felt" in the way described above.
>An important distinction is discussed later on page 190
>
>"...under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, 'real'
>anxiety is rare. (I agree totally with this- no one would
>attend a hockey game if this was not true)....Only because
>Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it
>become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically."
>
>H sayes that the 'phenomenon' of anxiety has been 'partly'
>neglected generally in 'the existential analytic of Dasein'
>as a result of a failure to 'recognize the phenomenon of
>state of mind'" [BT 190]
John that is just a blatant misreading on your part! LOOK at the whole text:
"Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of "real" anxiety are attempts to
interpret this phenomenon according to the principles of its
existential-ontological constitution and function. The reasons for this lie
partly in the general neglect of the existential analytic of dasein, but
more particularly in a failure to recognize the phenomenon of
state-of-mind." (SuZ 190)
So he is NOT saying that the phenomenon of state of mind has been neglected
in the existential analytic of Dasein. He says that there has been a neglect
OF the existential analytic of Dasein, "BUT MORE PARTICULARLY" in a failure
to recognize the phenomenon of state-of-mind. So the neglect has been
precisely the lack of performing an existential analytic of Dasein, MORE
PARTICULARLY a failure to recognize the phenomenon of state of mind. See the
difference between this and what you said?
>The footnote here refers to the history of 'timoris' (fear)
>and other states of mind as described analytically by
>Augustine to Kierkegaard (otherwise Christian
>'states-of-mind').
>
>At any rate H regards anxiety as a 'phenomenon' in the
>widest sense imaginable, that is, in any case, anxiety in a
>'primordial sense', a 'basic state of mind' for anxiety
>individualizes, gives birth (all at once) to the self,
>world, and Being-in.
>
>The primordial nature of human existence is 'already
>Being-in' <mitgesetzt>, which is essentially care.
I suppose you will now say that care is a feeling too.
>Rene, you can't insist on this distinction between the truth
>of rightness
>and the truth of openness while at the same time insisting
>on the ambiguity
>of the o/o distinction. After all, the truth of rightness is
>factical,
>whereas the truth of openness is ontological. So the very
>distinction you
>are making between these two kinds of truths presupposes the
>very
>distinction that you are trying to say is ambiguous in the
>first place! So
>if you don't want to spoil your reading of John Foster with
>the "rigidity"
>of the o/o distinction, then you also can't spoil your
>reading of ME with the very same "rigidity" of the
>truth-as-rightness/truth-as-openness distinction.
>
>Anthony Crifasi
>
>Anthony, not necessarily. If you are assuming that
>'rightness' has only a factical component, this might not
>stand in terms of ideation, and in concepts. Mathematics is
>an 'operation' dependent on synthesis, math is a synthetic
>process of ideation; placing concepts in agreement.
>Facticity in formal logic has very little correspondence
>with entities in the world, and with phenomenon.
Oh Geez John, CONCEPTS ARE ESSENTIALLY FACTICAL!!!! You are missing even the
basics John! Facticities are not just material things! Heidegger explicitly
places conceptual thought in the mode of presence, which is COMPLETELY
factical. John, you really need to take Heidegger 101 over again.
>The
>designation of a quantum is dependent on 'sense certainty'
>and on a relational 'agreement' in an object-subject field.
>
>Truth as H noted has a universal definition and that is that
>'truth is the revelatory essence of being'; and if we extend
>the meaning of being to all entities what-so-ever such as
>abstract entities with few or a sole quality, then
>'rightness' is dependent on what is revealed of entities. Of
>course in symbolic knowledge, essences revealed about
>entities are not exhausted by what is disclosed as
>phenomenon (ie. to human perception). So there is a limit to
>what is revealed for understanding. This is why existential
>anxiety and its modes of state of mind can be described as
>'fear' and the 'uncanny' et cetera since what these
>'feelings' disclose is something 'indefinite' and
>undetermined, but also what is factical.
On the contrary, FEAR is about something factically definite, since it is
always about something in the world. Remember, Heidegger explicitly said
that in the texts I gave you? Anxiety, on the other hand, is never about
something factical in the world. Remember, Heidegger explicitly said that in
the texts I gave you?
>As far as the
>positive sciences are concerned, as Wittgenstein claimed,
>'science wants to know nothing about nothing.' Likewise the
>assertion that the 'truth of openess' is 'ontological' is
>distinct from 'truth of rightness' is ontical is based on a
>metaphorical analogy between the two claims. This is like
>saying that the ontological is 'descriptive' and the ontical
>is 'interpretative' only. That is to say that the
>ontological is now reversed in intentionally as that which
>'shows' but cannot be 'intrepreted'. An opening thus if I am
>correct as you claim is what 'shows' as in 'phenomenon' and
>conversely what is 'right' is descriptive and not subject to
>intepretation; however as H demonstrates there are
>ontological phenomenon (however primordial) which show and
>are subject to discussion; only the ontical are not
>'interpretative'. A light remains a light until proven
>otherwise, and once it is proven not to be light, it is no
>longer a light, but a source of darkness, for example.
>Ontology refers to 'how one is' but not to 'what one is'
>necessarily.
If by "what one is" you mean a factical essence, then ontology does not
refer to what one is. If by "what one is" you mean fundamental existential
structure, then yes ontology refers to what one is. You can't just leave it
with general terms like "what one is" and expect to make a coherent
interpretation here John!
>While I can agree that there is a plausible distinction
>between a 'phenomenal ontology' and 'judgements -being
>right, truth claimes in general, validity, inferential
>wisdom), I think that the 'reverse' is more likely to be
>true,
>which is that 'openess' is not 'ontological' but rather
>belongs to those entities which are factical.
Again with the vague terminology John! YES openness "belongs" to the
factical. YES the ontological "belongs" to the factical. But SPECIFICALLY,
this means that the ontological is exhibited THROUGH the factical! They are
not FACTICALLY distinct (i.e., it's not as if the ontological is some
factical "structure" which is factically "behind" the ontic world), but they
are still distinct in that the ontological AS ontological is not per se
factical. Do you see the difference?
>There is a
>'categorical error' made by stipulating that....And that for
>me is confusing.
>
>The 'open' is a true metaphor for those attributes and their
>entities which 'show' from time to time, but 'rightness' is
>not a matter of description but entirely 'interpretative'
>(cf. Sextus Empiricus). All propositions are false to some
>degree, and it is not entirely resolved if there is a
>general consensus on the validity of any propositions used
>to 'prove' truth. Truth is an 'axiological' value. The
>metaphor used for describing what
>appears or shows itself (in relation to those modes of
>closeness, etc.), the opening, has no requirement to be
>interpreted. For instance Aristotle relates about the
>perception of a light in the distance, which all agree is a
>fire, but on closer inspection it turns out to be a
>lighthouse (In De Anima - I cannot remember). The opening,
>the light as a fact does not change, but the cause of the
>light, the source of the light does change.
>
>Likewise the ontical is not subject to 'interpretation' it
>simply IS, and the ontological is 'open' for
>'interpretation' 'reflection' and 'analysis'.
John, for Heidegger, the ontic is PRECISELY THE RESULT OF INTERPRETATION. It
is the result of Dasein's projective understanding upon its own pure
potentiality for being. You mean interpretation in an ONTIC sense, like
"interpretating" a factical phenomena.
Anthony Crifasi
>(cf. Paleontology vrs Archeology)
>
> In ecology
>there are 2 fundamental branches: one is 'interpretative'
>and the other is 'descriptive', or in other words 'applied'
>and 'theoretical'.
>
>Onto-theology is speculative ontology, tends to be dogmatic,
>but critical ontology is discursive; whereas "Dasein is
>ontically distinctive in that it is ontological" (which
>implies an ambiguous reference to all our discussions
>formerly). [BT 12]
>
>Which means that existenz is enacted discursively, open for
>interpretation and questioning; ontology is a logos, a
>logical discussion about what is primordial using new
>'categories' of the soul, or self, world and
>being-in-the-world. The categories are unique in that they
>are of a spatial and temporal nature (remoteness,
>ready-to-hand, et cetera, factual) and also of a existential
>nature (remorse, guilt, anxiety, care, joy, etc).
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