From: Rene de Bakker <rene.de.bakker@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2003 13:54:29 +0200
At 16:00 28-3-03 +0000, Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>Then in the next paragraph we are told that anxiety is
>>'disclosive' and that "a state of mind makes manifest how
>>one is. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny' <Befindlichkeit>."
>>Being-in-the-world therefore is a feeling too, it is a
>>feeling of 'being at home'
>Do you have any idea how utterly absurd it is to characterize
>being-in-the-world as a feeling? You are like a dog ...
25-3-03 I quoted Heidegger, What is metaphysics:
"What we so call 'feelings', is neither a fleeting companying-appearance
of our discursive and voluntative behavior, nor a mere causing drive
to such, nor a mere occurrent state, to which we come to terms
one way or the other."
But 'feelings', moods, Stimmungen, are "the fundamental happening
of our Da-sein", non-occurrent, non-objectifiable Grundgeschehen.
If it is utterly absurd to characterize Dasein as feeling, then Heidegger,
but also Leibniz and Nietzsche - who says dozens of times, wtp is a
feeling- , and in fact all real thinkers, in fact all people, are reduced to
And that's where formal distinctions will bring you, no further
than distinctions of analytical philosophy, or of whatever technique
else. The ontological distinction, as presented by Anthony, is
a FORMAL, an ABSTRACT distinction, and that it must be so,
is clear when you read section 1: if we don't know what the
word 'being' means, then we also can't know what the difference
of being and beings is. They're just two words, two distinct things.
Thomas knew, he is able to speak of being, of 'ens', but we don't,
that's what Heidegger is saying by quoting him.
This is also a nice example of the blindness, that is the consequence
of insisting on knowing, and not on asking.
"The question for the sense of Being shall be POSED." Gestellt.
Eine Frage stellen, posing a question, here, is not merely a linguistic
speech-act, the problem itself must be given a place, where it then
can remain. That is "stellen" when one avers the word as H does here.
We know from what follows, that the question for Being can only
be fixated, when Dasein as the exemplary being is questioned
(befragt) Posing questions belongs to the mode of being of Dasein.
So that, when a new question is to be posed, a new Dasein is
>with a bone - as soon as
>you see some word that has a usual ontic meaning, like "feeling," you don't
>even consider that in an ontological analytic, he just might be using the
>term in a non-ontic sense. You probably interpreted discourse, call,
>conscience, and falling in precisely the same way. YES he says that we
>"feel" uncanny, but look at his EXPLANATION of uncanniness:
drs. Rene de Bakker
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