John Foster wrote:
>Anthony, here are some defintions of mitsein. It is a word used worldwide,
>and
>has a consistent meaning. Mitsein is meant to convey 'togetherness' but I
>like
>the last definition the most by Michael Eldred:
>
>"Thus the essence of the relation between consciousnesses is not the
>Mitsein:
>it is conflict." [Being and Nothingness, Sartre. 555]
>
>In this instance war is extreme conflict, whereas Mitsein is harmony or
>togetherness, it could even be solitude in the sense of sole - at - one-
>ment,
>to be one in the sun, a single lumination. This sol at one ment is related
>to a
>tone ment and a tune ment. (See Sein und Zeit, 'atunement')
Terms like harmony and non-conflict are deceptive when applied to mitsein,
due to their ontic connotations. Their meanings have to be very carefully
qualified in this context. The reason that the relation between
consciousnesses is not being-with but a conflict is that your consciousness
is YOUR consciousness, and mine is mine. That divide is in itself conflict.
So he is not talking about some lack of ontic agreement or some ontic war.
We can be conscious OF the same things, but your consciousness of it and
mine are still distinct consciousnesses - yours and mine. So first and
foremost, consciousness is "I", NOT They. That is precisely why Heidegger
subordinates the interpretation of Dasein in terms of consciousness -
because for Heidegger, Dasein is first and foremost They, not I. In
everydayness, the They is constitutive of literally EVERYTHING (which is why
mitsein is an existential constitutive of being in the world AS SUCH).
>"Listening to... is the existenzial openness of Dasein as Mitsein for the
>other.
>Listening even constitutes the primary and proper openness of Dasein for
>its
>ownmost possibility of being [...] Listening to one another, in which
>togetherness [Mitsein] is cultivated further, has the possible modes of
>following, accompanying, the privative modes of not listening, resisting,
>defiance, of turning away. (translation ME)" (SuZ 163)
>
>As essentially Mitsein, Dasein cannot help but listen to others and thus
>explicitly share the world in speech. Even in not following what others
>say, in
>disagreeing with them, Dasein is sharing its being-in-the-world with
>others. M.
>Eldred
Yes THAT is what Heidegger means. It is a listening that has nothing to do
with some ontic togetherness, group, or agreement, because it is equally
present when we disagree, when we are not together, when we are not a member
of some ontic group. He is saying that being-with goes into the very
constitution of the world per se, so literally everything in the world is a
being-with, including worldly disagreements like wars.
>Like Heidegger and others claim, S. Kierkegaard, Dasein is a 'mitsein'
>which
>is disclosed in 'moodiness' (having a mood). Thus solitude and togetherness
>are similar, since if I feel at one with all, then there is an experience
>or
>mood of mitdasein (without any logical explanation). Sartre refers to
>mitsein as not being the essence of the relation between consciousnesses.
>Conflict is not mitsein. Mitsein is not simply a concept, but rather
>disclosed as an intuition of creaturely togetherness. It would be hard to
>simply feel the same way about rocks as we do people, or pets. Maybe in
>mitdasein we see some 'marbles' strewn about, and wonder where the kids
>are.
This is how Heidegger describes it:
"In our 'description' of that environment which is closest to us - the
work-world of the craftsman, for example - the outcome was that along with
the equipment to be found when one is at work, those Others for whom the
'work' is destined are 'encountered too'. If this is ready-to-hand, then
there lies in the kind of Being which belongs to it (that is, in its
involvement) an essential assignment or reference to possible wearers, for
instance, for whom it should be 'cut to the figure'. Similarly, when
material is put to use, we encounter its producer or supplier as one who
serves well or badly. When, for example, we walk along the edge of a field
but 'outside it,' the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a
person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used was bought at
so-and-so's shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth. The boat
anchored at the shore is assigned in its Being-in-itself to an acquaintance
who undertakes voyages with it; but even if it is a 'boat which is strange
to us,' it still is indicative of Others. The Others who are thus
'encountered' in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are
not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally just
present-at-hand; such 'things' are encountered from out of the world in
which they are ready-to-hand for Others - a world which is always mine TOO
in advance." (SuZ 117-118)
The examples he uses are not very controversial, since they have direct
ontic connections to people (garments, well kept fields, boats). But these
are meant to be illustrative of literally EVERYTHING in the world
whatsoever, from the dirt beneath our feet to the most distant star in the
sky. Anything we encounter, and any way we encounter it, is an encounter
with Others. That includes war.
Anthony Crifasi
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