From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 17:53:23 +0000
Rene de Bakker wrote:
> Dasein, Mitsein are nothing generic, as Anthony claims.
When did I ever say it was something "generic," unless by "generic" you
simply that it is not any entitative group or individual, which would then
put Heidegger himself in your crosshairs?
Maybe you will check your own posts? I cannot find it, but i'm sure
it must be there, and if not downright generic, then generic-related.
From the beginning you're interpreting existentials with help of the
ontic-ontologic distinction. As soon as you could detect sthing
ontical - Bush, or Lawrence of Arabia - you said: that's ontic, and
Well Rene, AREN'T THEY? Doesn't Heidegger himself quite explicitly say that
mitsein does not mean an entitative "they," as the UN is an entitative
"they"? Doesn't Heidegger himself say that Dasein's essence is not any
existent? That's *all* I mean. That is "generic" only in the most empty
sense - the sense of not-a-specific-entity, which is also true of
traditional notions of "genus" and "species," which do not signify any
specific individual. But these come with all kinds of metaphysical baggage
that doesn't transfer to Heidegger's notion of "ontological," so much so
that it becomes deceptive to label the latter by the same term, "generic"
(except, as I said, in the most empty sense).
Lately again, when you - not i - brought the
formal notion of guilt, in order to excuse concrete guilt. But that is
not what existentials are good for. That is not what H is doing in BT.
Rene only you could characterize what I did as *excusing* concrete guilt.
What I argued was that the Heideggerian items that were being used against
certain entities transcend the blaming AND excusing of any entity. If I were
trying to *excuse* those entities existentially, I would have argued those
Heideggerian items actually exonerate their behavior. That is a quite
He has quite another goal, when warning that in BT he's not talking of
specific (ontic) cases. And that goal, is, as he repeats again and
You still have to answer the question, how Heidegger is able to say,
that the ontically nearest is the ontologically remotest. Possible
application: the lying Blair. ("Saddam is able to hit London in 45
minutes, there's no doubt about that"). The ontological is in the
but hidden...otherwise he would indeed explode.
How is what I'm saying in any way opposed to your statement that the
ontological is in the ontic? As Heidegger says, there is no *difference*
between these as if they were two distinct entities, but he ADDS that they
are different. So he said we have a different (ontological difference)
without a difference (ontic difference). As for his statement that what is
ontically nearest is the ontologically remotest, I'd have to see the context
again to make sure, but from what I remember, wasn't he just saying that
when we are immersed in what is *familiar* (ontically nearest), their
ontological structure remains hidden?
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