For example a single
human started fire in Yellowstone burned over
half of the park after a
Forest Service employee burned her boyfriends
letter. One careless act wiped
out over half the largest protected area in the
state of Colorado and in the
southern USA.
What fire are you talking about? I've never
heard of this, a park servive employee burned a
letter and started a huge fire in Yellowstone?
I know one of their intentional controlled burns
went out of control, but that's not what you're
talking about.
--- heidegger-digest
<owner-heidegger-digest@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>
> heidegger-digest Friday, May 7 2004
> Volume 02 : Number 2717
>
>
>
> In this issue:
> ==============
>
> Bob Guevara Re: Re: Evolution of
> the Specious
> GEVANS613@xxxxxxx Re: Evolution of the
> Specious
> Bob Guevara Conversation
>
> Jan Straathof Re: Re: appeal-to-war
>
> "John Foster" Re: Re: appeal-to-war
>
>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Date: Thu, 6 May 2004 22:54:01 +0000
> From: Bob Guevara <guevara.guevara@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: Re: Evolution of the Specious
>
> >
> > From: GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
> > Date: 2004/05/06 Thu PM 10:27:24 GMT
> > To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: Evolution of the Specious
> >
> > In a message dated 06/05/2004 20:37:52 GMT
> Standard Time,
> > _michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> (
mailto:michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
> writes: on 6/5/04
> > 11:31 am,
> > Michael:
> > So how do you answer ? does 'the ontological'
> refer to the 'the ontological
> > ontic,' and if not from whence commeth the
> phantom: THE of 'the ontological?'
> > Jud, I'm unaware that I have ever referred to
> "the ontological" myself (it
> > was Bob who spake that),
> > Jud: Yes I know ? but you let it go
> unremarked. I doubt that Bob will even
> > understand what we are talking about ? so
> does it really matter? Now if you
> > wanted to know how to saddle up a horse or
> scour a skiddle with sand ? he's your
> > man. ;-)
>
>
>
> Perhaps I should hail a passing cowboy or
> indian and have him explain it to me. ...I
> must admit Jud, sometimes I laugh so hard and,
> yes, I do thank you for many gems.
>
> Bob
>
>
>
> > Michael... except when speaking of the
> ontological difference, where the
> > "the" refers to "difference"
> > Jud: In which case [within the parameters of
> the argot of the sect] you were
> > correct - for 'ontological' is an adjective
> which can be legitimately
> > grammatically employed to describe the
> abstract noun 'difference.'
> > Michael:... which originally resonates with
> Heraclitus' 'diapheromenon' the
> > difference that is different to its self (i.
> e., not a being), i. e., that
> > [is] being.
> > Jud: "The difference that is different to its
> self?" Hahahah! Now THAT
> > sounds like one of the Hellenist manqué
> Heidegger's wishful thinking translations
> > which made him such a laughingstock amongst
> proper Helenists? It reads a lot
> > like one of those comical translations into
> English that one sometimes finds
> > on the user-instructions for a record-player
> manufactured in China. There is
> > NOTHING in the meaning of the word to suggest
> that it indicates or points to
> > the rather Gothic construction 'difference
> that is different to itself.'
> > There IS NO DIFFERENCE WHICH IS DIFFERENT TO
> THE SELF there are only THINGS WHICH
> > ARE DIFFER FROM OTHER THINGS. as perceived
> and classified by those humans
> > who perceive things to be different. Kahn
> renders the word as 'variance' 'from
> > notes at variance' and Freeman & Jones gives:
> ...'from things that differ.'
> > Lattimore provides: 'comes out of differents'
> so please reveal the brave boyo
> > who renders it as: 'the difference that is
> different to its self.' He wasn't
> > a little an with sweaty palms from Marburg
> with a Hitler moustache smelling
> > of saurkraut was it by any chance?
> > Michael: Such difference (the ontological
> difference) is the ground of that
> > curious jointure of being and beings such
> that being is not identical to nor a
> > part of nor belongs to nor is a-part of
> (etc) the being it is the being of.
> > Jud: What do you mean GROUND of the
> 'jointure?' What ground and what
> > jointure are you referring to? What EVIDENCE
> have you that there is a GROUND and a
> > JOINTURE and a BEING except in your
> imagination? How can a 'being' be not
> > identical [or identical] to something that
> doesn't exist? Because Mekon the
> > Splurg on the planet Grunge doesn't exist ?
> does that mean that Prince Philip is
> > not identical to it? Hahahaha! You really
> have no idea at all how comical
> > Heideggerianism is do you? ;-) If as you say:
> ' being is not identical to nor a
> > part of nor belongs to nor is a-part of
> > (etc) the being it is the being of.' why on
> earth do you use the genitive
> > phrase '.. the being it is the being of,' in
> your denial of any attachment
> > between the ontic being and its seemingly
> indefinable spirituous arms-length
> > metaphysical twin? [or whatever you wish to
> call it or not it?] Again where is
> > your evidence for this weird ontological
> claim of genitivality and who was the
> > brilliant salesman who sold you the idea? He
> wan't the same guy who sold some
> > poor American sap the Tower Bridge was he?
> ;-)
> > Michael: By not being an other being,
> > Jud: As it is physically impossible to be or
> not be another being ? pray was
> > has that got to do with the thing? For
> example ? tomorrow I have decided not
> > to be George Bush's clown of a Foreign
> Secretary - mainly because there is a
> > strong possibility that I would end up on my
> arse on the gravel outside of
> > the main door to the Whitehouse. Does that
> make sense?
> > MichaeL; ... being (the difference in each
> and every instance different) the
> > difference between a being and its being is
> no thing (is not a being) but
> > not nothing
> > Jud: How in the bowels of Jesus. H. Christ
> can anything be 'not nothing'? If
> > something is 'not nothing' it is an existing
> something isn't it? This is just
> > the same as not being one of Anthony's
> pop-up-and-down-mountains, or not
> > being the King of France, or not being Mekon
> the Splurg on the planet Grunge. If
> > as you stated earlier] 'there is a curious
> jointure of being and beings such
> > that being is not identical to nor a part of
> nor belongs to nor is a-part of
> > (etc) the being it is the being of.' why do
> you persist in attaching the
> > genitive pronoun 'its' to the woo-woo Being
> in relation to the entity to which
> > [by your constant employment of the
> genitive] you are claiming 'belongs' to
> > the entity? A full explanation please if you
> don't mind. Who are you not being
> > this evening BTW? Perhaps I could recommend
> not being an Iraqi internee?
> > Michael:
> > (except when beings are said or stipulated to
> be the only worthwhile
> > speaking of or considering; nothing but
> mattergy; then, of course, being will be
> > said to be precisely nothing, void).
> > Jud: This on balance would be the most sane
> way of talking about that which
> > exists ? yes.
> > Michael: But being is the being of a being in
> each case and thus is some how
> > the same as that being:
> > Jud: There you go again with your genitival
> claims about 'BEING' being some
> > sort of ontological chattel of the being it
> belongs to. From whence cometh
> > this proprietorial relationship? Who set it
> up? Where can the partnership be
> > viewed in action? Are you SURE it is not
> merely a fiction in your mind
> > engendered by the brainwashing you got as a
> kid?
> > Michael: thus being (the difference) is both
> different and the same (as its
> > self and the being it is the being of).
> > Jud: Hahaha! How can something be 'different
> ' and the 'same' at the same
> > time? 'The Being it is the being of' might be
> meaningful to the members of your
> > strange cabal ? but it is utterly meaningless
> to someone like me. That is not
> > to say that I do not understand your
> confusion and know how the error of
> > thinking originated. But then again I
> understand why children believe in the
> > childish fancies ? but in understanding do
> not accept them as real or meaningful
> > other than in the sense of them being
> meaningful to the children.
> > MichaeL; Or, for example, the being of an
> apparent being (that which
> > appears) is the appearing of the appearance
> of the apparent thing, something (not
> > some thing) that is both the endurance of the
> appearance and the coming to
> > appearance of the apparent thing and thus
> always different to it...
> > Jud: Hahahah! MORE! MORE! Now with the
> greatest respect Michael - that is
> > utter gobbledegook, which I am sure will
> cause even your fellow cultists to
> > cringe.
> > MichaeL: So: "the ontological" should always
> be referring to the difference
> > and not to itself ("ontological"). N'est pas?
> > Jud: N'est pas? Sure. But can't you see that
> this 'ontological' nonsense is
> > no more than the cobbling together of
> convoluted adjectival and adverbial
> > phraseology which DESCRIBES THE ONTIC, and
> that the apparent 'difference' is
> > only imaginary? It is the ONTIC which exists
> and the so-called 'ontological' is
> > no more than a descriptive account of it? An
> account of its existential
> > presence and ramifications for other
> onticities? How can you NOT FAIL to see this
> > fact?
> > Michael: When you say (paraphrasing...) that
> the entity exists in the way it
> > exists, you strangely say something similar
> to Heidegger, but this needs a
> > long long explication and I have not the time
> (now). In your attempt to speak
> > the unutterable you are whiling in the
> proximity of Heideggerian thinking to
> > the extent that you do not fall entirely
> into the Nominalistic mysticism that
> > it tends to when unattended by a certain
> sense of the tradition in which it
> > receives its life blood.
> > Jud: There is a big difference Michael in
> stating the obvious, that an
> > entity exists in the way it exists and
> claiming that in addition to its existing
> > it 'has' an 'existence' or a 'Being' and that
> one gets two for the price of
> > one. How far would you get if when you
> purchased a new piano you insisted that
> > you wanted its existence to and that you
> wanted proof that the existence was
> > part of the deal? Hahahah! The whole idea is
> so sweet really ? it reminds me
> > of the 'Luvvies' in show business ? it has
> the same kind of resonance of
> > kookiness ? of an enclosed order of
> ideosyncratic nuttiness than can grow on one
> > and become endearing. But then one remembers
> its dark corridors of Freiburg
> > Uni - and the smile freezes.
> > regards,
> > Jud
> > Nullius in Verba
> >
> >
>
_
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
>
> >
>
(
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
>
> > JUD EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM
> >
> >
> >
> > --- StripMime Warning -- MIME attachments
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Date: Thu, 6 May 2004 19:12:46 EDT
> From: GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Evolution of the Specious
>
> In a message dated 06/05/2004 23:55:05 GMT
> Standard Time,
> guevara.guevara@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>
>
> >
> > From: GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
> > Date: 2004/05/06 Thu PM 10:27:24 GMT
> > To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: Evolution of the Specious
> >
> > In a message dated 06/05/2004 20:37:52 GMT
> Standard Time,
> > _michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> (
mailto:michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
> writes: on 6/5/04
> > 11:31 am,
> > Michael:
> > So how do you answer ? does 'the
> ontological' refer to the 'the
> ontological
> > ontic,' and if not from whence commeth the
> phantom: THE of 'the
> ontological?'
> > Jud, I'm unaware that I have ever referred
> to "the ontological" myself (it
>
> > was Bob who spake that),
> > Jud: Yes I know ? but you let it go
> unremarked. I doubt that Bob will even
>
> > understand what we are talking about ? so
> does it really matter? Now if
> you
> > wanted to know how to saddle up a horse or
> scour a skiddle with sand ?
> he's your
> > man. ;-)
>
>
>
> Perhaps I should hail a passing cowboy or
> indian and have him explain it to
> me. ...I must admit Jud, sometimes I laugh so
> hard and, yes, I dothank you
> for many gems.
>
> Bob
> Jud:
> Glad you appreciated it Bob - for as you
> rightly realised it was only [as
> ever] in jest. In truth I do respect you and
> almost everybody else here, and
> enjoy the fun and the odd [and I mean odd]
> snippets of info that rub off.
> It's just that...well... I enjoy poking fun at
> the Reverend Slybegger and
> his merry band of curious clericals...You
> wouldn't deny an old man a bit o'
> fun in his last faltering steps of comportment
> towards the blissful
> companionship of the eternally
> comportmentalised would you? ;-)
> regards,
> Jud
> Nullius in Verba
>
>
_
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>
>
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>
> JUD EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM
>
>
>
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Date: Fri, 7 May 2004 1:54:17 +0000
> From: Bob Guevara <guevara.guevara@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Conversation
>
> MichaelP,
>
> I'd like to invite you to give me your thoughts
> on the possibility of a post-metaphysical world
> in terms of it's conversation.
>
> I'm an engineer by profession. I speak a very
> specialized language in that arena. I assert
> that non-engineers would be at a loss to get
> the nuance of that world and by attempting to
> participate in that conversation. Does this
> make sense?
>
> Like-wise the Heideggarian conversation is very
> specialized and specially when spoken by expert
> philosophers. I say that if a post-metaphyical
> world comes to pass, it will require everyone
> to fully-participate in that conversation.
>
> Problem:
>
> I loved your rendition of "difference" and
> never using "the ontological" except when
> saying: "ontological difference." It's elegance
> communicated much. But, what would that
> elegance accomplish in a world that can't
> "hear" it in it's fullness.
>
> Can the Heideggarian conversation indeed be
> spoken such that it isn't limited to the very
> few, the highly educated and the expert?
>
> Bob
>
>
>
>
> --- from list
> heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Date: Fri, 7 May 2004 01:49:41 +0100
> From: Jan Straathof <janstr@xxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: Re: appeal-to-war
>
> Hi John, you wrote:
>
> >Gestell is not a thing. It is a concept, thus
> it cannot be real.
>
> I'm a bit puzzled by this phrase John, i mean,
> why can't a concept
> be real, or do you define (the concept) "real"
> as something purely
> material (physical) ?
>
> And what about "metaphysics", "technology",
> "freedom", "interest
> and desire", "art" etc. etc. -- are they real ?
>
> You seem to be saying that only a "thing" is
> real, but according to
> Heidegger, a thing is only then a thing in so
> far it is gathered into
> "Geviert" (the Fourfold of earth, heaven, men
> and gods), i.e. a thing
> is a phenomenonal ensemble which brings
> together, in sharing unity,
> physical, metaphysical, anthropological and
> theological dimensions.
>
> I think concepts (ideas, ideologies, theories,
> philosohies etc.) are
> very real things, they change individual
> persons as much as they
> change the world !!!!
>
> yours,
> Jan
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --- from list
> heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Date: Fri, 7 May 2004 02:16:19 -0700
> From: "John Foster" <borealis@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: Re: appeal-to-war
>
> - ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Jan Straathof" <janstr@xxxxxxx>
> To: <heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 5:49 PM
> Subject: Re: Re: appeal-to-war
>
>
> > Hi John, you wrote:
> >
> > >Gestell is not a thing. It is a concept,
> thus it cannot be real.
> >
> > I'm a bit puzzled by this phrase John, i
> mean, why can't a concept
> > be real, or do you define (the concept)
> "real" as something purely
> > material (physical) ?
> >
> > And what about "metaphysics", "technology",
> "freedom", "interest
> > and desire", "art" etc. etc. -- are they real
> ?
> >
> > You seem to be saying that only a "thing" is
> real, but according to
> > Heidegger, a thing is only then a thing in so
> far it is gathered into
> > "Geviert" (the Fourfold of earth, heaven, men
> and gods), i.e. a thing
> > is a phenomenonal ensemble which brings
> together, in sharing unity,
> > physical, metaphysical, anthropological and
> theological dimensions.
> >
> > I think concepts (ideas, ideologies,
> theories, philosohies etc.) are
> > very real things, they change individual
> persons as much as they
> > change the world !!!!
> >
> > yours,
> > Jan
>
> Concepts have their own 'reality' in a mind
> which thinks them. As for their
> existence, they certainly exist. However
> concepts have only an 'ideal
> existence' and thus are not represented by the
> minutae of the real external
> world, except as 'instances'. I do not take the
> extreme view that concepts
> have no existence. What I term 'real' is
> 'experiential', the 'sensory' and
> the 'imperical' since these types of reality
> are primarily phenomenal. What
> Heidegger suggests I believe is that due to
> human dasein being thrown in to
> the world, that every experience is somehow
> determined by a range of
> acquired responses. One example would be the
> way an individual experiences a
> natural phenomenon. A full moon in the spring
> may be associated with a
> certain celebration, say May Day.
>
> In the experience which is somehow determined
> prior to thinking, it may be
> that the actor does perceive - and experience
> it -the celebration in a
> similar way as do others in his social milieu.
> For instance when I was
> younger, much younger, we celebrated May Day be
> attending the local baseball
> tournament, and took part in contests, went to
> the local dance. I did not
> think that May Day was celebrated any other
> way. Often the river at this
> time was very high, near peak flow, the
> cottonwood trees shed their seeds of
> fluff everywhere, and it was a great occasion
> to see mostly everyone there
> who lived in the small town I lived in. This
> was the way it was for my first
> 20 years.
>
> I don't take part in this celebration any
> longer. Metaphysics to my mind was
> just a word until I read Plato at about the age
> of 13. My conceptual
> thinking at this early stage was limited to
> what I experienced in my social
> milieu which was incredibly sheltered and
> insular. I had no concept about
> what really war was about except that one of my
> uncles returned from WW2
> suffering from shell shock or some type of
> fright. We did not like Germans,
> or the ones our country fought. We made up
> songs like: "I am Popeye the
> Sailor Man/I eat all my spinach/ and spit out
> all the Germans." My best
> friends though were German-Canadians. Their
> Grandfather was a POW in our
> local community and incarcerated in a POW camp
> about 3 miles to the north on
> a mountain side of thick forest. After WW2
> ended he returned and lived here,
> working in the sawmill.
>
> Later on after I began reading Plato and Hume
> and Carlyle, as well as
> others, my conceptual understanding took a deep
> U turn. I no longer believed
> that a race could embody a 'feeling' or be
> 'distrusted' or have any sort of
> character which was not in part acquired.
>
> So in a sense the fourfold - which for
> Heidegger is more or less symbolic -
> is makes possible the totality of the 'thing'
> but the thing is what is
> experienced. Another example. I work in the
> profession of forestry. After I
> completed my course work, I found that I no
> longer experienced the forest
> the same way as I did prior to taking the
> course work. I often was aware of
> the commercial value of the forest, ie., it
> appeared to be 'worth money' and
> this awareness was difficult to swallow. In
> other words my original awe and
> joy was subverted by the commercial, and it's
> instrumentality. But at this
> time, I did realize that there were millions,
> perhaps billions of people who
> need wood, and are willing to pay to have it
> shipped from here over vast
> distances to use it. I had no idea that there
> was any other material to
> build residences out of, and I took the
> profession of forestry as to be as
> important as medicine, and more important than
> most other professions.
>
> At the same time I also believed strongly in
> other uses of the forest such
> as wilderness solitude, and as refuge and home
> for a vast consortium of
> other species. Nevertheless, much of my beliefs
> were formed from my own
> experience of what was real, which was that the
> forest was a singular entity
> very sensual, and truely 'inconceivable' in the
> most important respect. I
> did not realize until a few years ago while in
> Latin America that wood was
> not a central 'value' for humans to build homes
> from. I visited a desert
> region on the west coast of tropical South
> America and found that adobe and
> concrete were the primary materials used to
> build dwellings. I thought about
> this are then realized that since there are now
> 6.3 billion humans on the
> earth that in no way could the existing forest
> continue to supply wood and
> paper on demand. I even did some calculations
> and assessed that in about
> 40-60 years based on projected demand, the will
> not enough forests left to
> sustain consumption worldwide. I thus had a
> sudden revelation about forests.
> They are vastly more important than we think
> and in no case can forests be -
> in general - made to serve civilization in
> perpetuity.
>
> What this all meant for me was that the
> profession of forestry is
> sustainable. Since the forest is vastly
> incomprehensible, and thus not
> conceptual, or cannot be embraced by conceptual
> thinking, I had the
> revelation that what I experienced or sensed
> was actually - factically -
> much older, much wiser, and much more
> empathetic than what my limited
> understanding was capable of appreciating. I
> thus had the vision to
> conceptualize what was sustainable and that was
> to start by eliminating as
> much wood from useage as possible - in order to
> save what was left of the
> forests in Amazonia, the Congo, and the very
> large boreal forest, as well as
> elsewhere. I had a problem with thinking
> conceptually about forests because
> the standard practice is to apply zonation to
> each area of forest based on
> some attribution, or classificatory scheme.
> There would be protected area
> here, another there, and in between, in a
> checkerboard fashion there would
> be much more commercial forest which would be
> harvested for various items
> from mushrooms to wood. Zonation makes
> conceptualization possible, but it
> does not guarantee a desired outcome, far from
> it. For example a single
> human started fire in Yellowstone burned over
> half of the park after a
> Forest Service employee burned her boyfriends
> letter. One careless act wiped
> out over half the largest protected area in the
> state of Colorado and in the
> southern USA. Of course it has regenerated due
> to the fact that the pine
> released many seeds from the cones which
> survive many wildfires. But there
> are no wolves nor Grizzly bears left in
> Yellowstone Park.
>
> So this concept of forest planning completely
> proved to me that unless we as
> a species find alternatives to using the forest
> by killing it by
> clearcutting it and roading it, we will
> facilitate the extinction of more
> species than since the greatest period of
> extinction some 200-300 million
> years ago after a comet hit Guatamala.
>
> What I understand as the forest here is
> something almost as endless. It
> surrounds my home for thousands of kilometers,
> and even this appears to at
> risk of depletion. Prior to about 1970, the
> forest here seemed infinite,
> inexhaustible and incapable of maladaption.
> What we have replaced it with is
> becoming maladapted, less resilience to various
> stressors, and possible no
> longer a true forest.
>
> So what was the whole purpose for forest
> ecology and science?
>
> IT is a fire truck, except that the police
> sirens are headed the wrong way.
>
> chao
>
> john
>
>
>
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of heidegger-digest V2 #2717
> ********************************
>
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