Re: Heidegger on Husserl

>As Jean-Luc Marion points out, Heidegger's critique of Decartes
>is as much adressed against Husserl. And temporality - or rather,
>the lack of it - plays a central role in this critique
>(cf. _Vorhandenheit_, i.e. the permanence [sic] of intra-mundane
>beings).
>Henk

I can't agree with the Husserl = cartesian subjectivity line. There's a
section in the Logical Investigations where Husserl explicitly takes up the
critique of Cartesianism and specifically questions the self-evidence of
the ego as a ground (as subjectum or hypokeimenon) for philosophical
reflection. For Husserl (as in Heidegger) this unquestioned positing of the
ego as subject is a problem in both Descartes' and Kant's philosophies. And
the problem concerns a temporal analysis of the ego as intentional process
rather than as some sort of empirically embodied thinking thing. Husserl
distinguishes between the empirical ego as a content of consciousness and
the phenomenological ego as the temporal form of that consciousness. The
decade after the LI follows on from this temporal analysis in the
Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness that Heidegger refers to in his
draft of Being and Time, the History of the Concept of Time lectures.

What I find remarkable is the degree to which Heidegger's analyses of
temporality in the second division of BT seem to reflect Husserl's
phenomenology of time and yet there is no in depth reference to Husserl's
work in the lead up to BT (maybe the archives have the promised analysis
buried somewhere?). The lack of commentary by Heidegger also seems to add
to the tendency to write Husserl off as some sort of naive Cartesian (as in
Dreyfus) whereas as far as I can tell the opposite is true.

Thanks for the german reference, I'm also interested in anything Heidegger
might say about the problem besides oblique remarks about his ambiguous
debt to Husserl, perhaps from the Gesamtausgabe? Anyone?

Thanks,

Malcolm











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