Re: Heidegger on Husserl

>The issue is not whether "consciousness" is thought as an "existent
>thing", but
>that temporality 'takes place' within consciousness, i.e. that the being of
>consciousness is not existentiality (the being of Dasein). In other words,
>the
>_being_ of consciousness is not a question for Husserl, nor does Husserl se=
e
>that the _only_ phenomenon is being (nor does hardly anyone else in the
>twentieth century see this).

I can't agree with this...if one wants to stay with the Heideggerean system
and its language then yes there is only being (and time), but it must still
be explicable. And consciousness of course can be interpreted in terms of
being, especially since it has its temporal mode of being what it is which
is of course no existent thing etc. My research interest is a Heideggerean
interpretation of the early Husserl in terms of the temporal problematic in
BT (which does seem to have a very strong Husserlian influence). According
to Heidegger, Husserl touches on the question of being in the 6th
investigation that deals with a phenomenological analysis of perception and
categorial intuition. Inasmuch as the latter then goes on to analyse the
temporal constitution of perception I think he remains close to the central
problematic of BT, without of course thematizing being qua being as
Heidegger does.

>The fault line does not become any softer by making a distinction between t=
he
>early and the late Husserl. The issue remains the same.

I'm not at all sure about this either, perhaps if we had access to the C
manuscripts on the temporality of intersubjectivity and 'pre-subjective'
time maybe you might be more generous in your appraisal of late Husserl...

>The crucial issue has nothing at all to do with widening the scope to inclu=
de
>additional themes, but with the fundamental shift from constituting the
>objectivity of the object in conseiousness to an analysis of the being of
>Dasein, in which objectivity itself is overcome. Such an overcoming has
>nothing
>to do with showing that Husserl was "wrong" but with trying to get at, i.e.
>remove the obstructions in thinking, how beings show themselves to Dasein o=
f
>themselves. This removal of obscurity is the deconstruction of the
>metaphysics
>of subjectivity, and is not aimed solely or especially at Descartes.

Again I simply can't agree, the crucial issue for me is the way in which
the temporality of Dasein is an articulated moment of care...it involves
the 'additional themes' concerning the temporalizing structure of
intentional comportments grounded in the ongoing transcendence of the sense
of being....it seems obvious to me that perceptions play a part in such
transcendence within the existential analytic. Heidegger makes much of the
greek sense of noein as a mode of disclosure as opposed to the traditional
emphasis on assertion and judgement. But then he also calls on the
ready-to-hand or practical aspect of intentionality to complete the
picture. And all this goes towards the articulated existential structure of
the 'fundamental experience' of the temporalizing being of Dasein given in
authentic temporality (etc). Authenticity might involve a 'fundamental
shift' and an 'overcoming of objectivity' but that is precisely the focus
of my interest in Husserl: in what way does the analytic of Dasein actually
overcome the metaphysics of subjectivity that also of course includes the
early Husserl's non-cartesian emphasis on the temporality of perception? I
can't be satisfied with merely invoking the inviolability of 'being'-here,
cos my supervisor requires that I explicate the problem in terms that make
sense outside of our small circle of Heidegger adepts :)

thanks,

Malcolm Riddoch

=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=
=83=83=83=83=83

Die Dichter m=FCssen auf
Der geistigen Weltlich sein

                         H=F6lderlin










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