??

Although I can't recall with precision, but a few messages ago someon
e raised the question whether it was 'logically possible' to speak wi
th oneself, or something to that effect. It was responded that such t
alk as 'logical possibility' wasn't worth dealing with, or something 
to that effect.

That question, though misleadingly stated, seems quite relevant to an
y discussion of Dasein (early, BT). Does anyone agree that if Dasein 
is to be thought of as, at least, an alternative to a Cartesian accou
nt of the kind of creature that we are, then we should look at the qu
estion whether Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument can be constr
ued as a kind of Transcendental Argument against Solipsism and any ph
ilosophical picture which renders so-called Problematic Idealism a vi
able or coherent account of what we are, or, perhaps, a kind of Trans
cendental Argument for the existence of Voice/language?

If Solipsism were the correct account of what a (one) creature, S, li
ke ourselves is, then for language to exist for S, S would have to se
cure through its own devices the necessary conditions for the existen
ce of language. Securing such conditions would require that S 'fix' t
he referent of terms which, at least allegedly, refer to certain psyc
hological or mental states -- indeed, for S, any terms which do refer
, must ultimately refer to some psychological or mental state of S (t
hat's Solipsism, by hypothesis). Fixing the referent of such terms wo
uld require that S establish some 'reference' relation -- whatever re
lation it is, is in virtue of which a term does refer -- between the 
term and its referent, which, again, must be a psychological state. I
n order to establish such a relation, at least according to Wittgenst
ein, would require that S enjoy command of the distinction between 'r
ight' and 'seems right'. However, for S, "whatever seems right is rig
ht." Consequently, S couldn't secure the conditions for language, so 
Solipsism couldn't be the correct account.

The last three steps in the argument are directly related to the Beet
le-in-the-box parable: just like the players' communications concerni
ng the Beetle, it is wrong to construe our talk about feelings and su
ch on the model of our 'referring to' or 'talking about' some item or
 other.

Of course, from here, its a big leap to argue that Dasein is it, or t
hat we are Dasein. However, that conclusion seems compelling once we 
start looking at the necessary conditions for securing Voice: everyon
e has an accent, but no one can genuinely hear their own. So from her
e does the accent originate?



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