From: "Anthony Crifasi" <Anthony.Crifasi@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1998 10:28:01 +0000
Malcolm Riddoch wrote:
> As for Husserl, no, of course he
> doesn't theorize 'worldhood' or 'being-in' in the sense Heidegger
> gives these existential structures. Then again, neither does he simply
> think an ego's consciousness in relation to objects, rather, he thinks
> the temporality of simple perceptions of the things themselves as
> constitutive of both the unity of consciousness and the 'objectness'
> of those things. The 'world' in Husserl's case is still given in the
> things themselves as they show themselves, it's a receptive notion of
> perception that also constitutes the ego as a unity in process. There
> is no separation here between 'mere appearances' and a transcendental
> world outside of these, cos we are already amongst the things
> themselves. In this sense Husserl is much closer to the 'world' in
> Heidegger's sense than he is to Descartes' empirically divided
In a way yes, in a way no. For Husserl, Being-in is not
Being-alongside because the actual being of the world is
suspended from the start of philosophy in the phenomenological
reduction, which means that the Ego is (for Husserl) not
Being-alongside from the start of philosophy. So in *that* very
important sense, Husserl is still essentially Cartesian.
> the problem - how does the simple disclosedness of the things
> themselves give itself? Not primarily in a theoretical 'seeing' of a
> physical object but in a practical absorption in dealing with
> Unfortunately Husserl complicates the matter here cos his emphasis on
> physical objects and scientific regard as a fundamental way in which
> the things themselves are given (his scientific neo-Cartesian bias) is
> grounded in that temporal problematic we have been talking about. And
> here we have to distinguish between theoretical seeing that reduces
> the being of things down to that of a mere physical object, and the
> temporal constitution of a thing such that it endures as what it is
> over time. This latter notion is a non-thematic 'seeing' (hearing,
> feeling) such that any straightforward perception implicitly remains
> what it is, and within the lived context of one's dealing with things.
That distinction between theoretical seeing and non-thematic 'seeing'
is *not* present in Husserlain phenomenology, despite the
appearances. The 'non-thematic seeing' you mention is, for Husserl,
still a constitutive synthesis belonging to consciousness, precisely
because the very Being of the world has been suspended from the start
in the phenomenological reduction. That means that Husserl is
interpreting 'non-thematic seeing' thematically - from essentially
the same viewpoint as Descartes, since prior to that whole analysis
is the comparison between dreams and non-dreaming experience
(explicitly mentioned by Husserl), and the consequent doubt in the
actuality of the world. So one cannot simply look at Husserl's notion
of the "lived world" and assume that he is therefore giving
"non-thematic seeing" a place in philosophy. For Husserl, real
'non-thematic seeing' is precisely what must be first
bracketed before philosophy can begin (at least the pre-Crisis
Husserl, before he was noticeably influenced by Heidegger).
> >perception, as
> >derivative of practical comportment, is also an opening up of beings
> >_in their being_.
> In part that is, because I can in no way see how perception is
> 'derived' from practical comportments.
Heidegger explains it in the following way. In "practical
comportments," a thing does not appear as "a thing," but IS its use -
a hammer is not "a hammer," but simply "hammering the wood in this
room under sky..." Therefore, in "practical comportment," the "thing
itself" is not experienced as "a thing," but as just the flow of its
practical activity, which therefore essentially includes everything
involved in the activity - the nails, wood, my hand, me, the sky -
all these are experienced not as individual things, but as "in the
hammering." Now, when we focus upon the hammer as an "individual
thing" as in individual perception, the thing now appears as an
individual in a context (ie, an individual, and then its context).
Thus, perception is, for Heidegger, a "deficient" mode because the
"thing itself" is lacking in "context." In that way, perception is a
deficient derivation of the mode of readiness-to-hand. But again, do
not confuse this type of "context" with the Husserlain emphasis on
"context," because again, the Husserlain emphasis on "context" must
be understood in light of the suspension of the very being of beings
in the phenomenological reduction. It is a "context" within the Ego's
constitutive synthesis, which assumes the cogito-cogitatum
distinction of intentionality. On cannot simply ignore the Husserlian
emphasis upon the need to make philosophy "disinterested," which is
precisely what Heidegger is denying when he emphasis the "interested"
nature of practical comportment. Husserl is still analyzing
"interest" in terms of "disinterest."
> Unless you mean perception as
> mere theoretical seeing of a thing as a physical object which itself
> is derived from simply seeing the thing itself in its practical
> context. But then you should be clearer I think as to which mode of
> perception you're talking about here, otherwize we'll just end up
> going around in confused circles. It seems obvious that the
> intentionality of perception as given by Husserl belongs within
> practical intentionality,
Again, that is *not* the case because Husserl's entire analysis
occurs within the context of the phenomenological reduction, which is
the suspension of the very actuality of the world itself. In
practical comportment, on the other hand, there neither is nor can be
any such suspension, precisely because such a suspension can only be
*theoretical* in origin. ALL of Husserlian phenomenology must be seen
in that context, which is what seperates him from Heidegger.
> >phenomenological bias amounts to adhering to a phenomenology of
> >perception, as if the things themselves show themselves of themselves
> >originarily to consciousness.
> Huh? I presume that you are conscious when you 'see' openness...or do
> you go into some sort of quasi-mystical unconscious fugue state?
To interpret the 'openness' in readiness-to-hand as "consciousness"
is to already analyze the non-thematic thematically. Nothing appears
"to consciousness" in readiness-to-hand, because there is then no
thematic distinction between cogito and cogitatum, which is the
distinction upon which Husserlian intentionality depends.
> Yep, but of course the 'side' of the world gives itself nowhere else
> than to Dasein...in that sense we can't have the world 'in itself' can
> we? Such is the finitude of human being. So we have the hammer, and I
> am assuming here that you, like myself, are at least conscious when
> you use that hammer. > And let's not fall back into simple cartesianism
> here, by conscious I don't mean that you represent it to your ego as
> 'this objective thing has a use value called hammering...'. No, we
> both merely come across it in the context of our work, and simply see
> it for what it is...the hammer...without even having to think about it
> as such. I also assume here that you can see and feel the hammer for
> what it is, otherwise how could you use it? In this sense the thing
> itself, the hammer, gives itself in a flux of straightforward
> perceptions, and in the context of whatever work is at hand.
You are equating 'openness' with 'consciousness,' the distinction
between which is not merely semantic. When I use the hammer, I am
indeed 'open,' but I am not necessarily "conscious" of it, because
"consciousness" implies a thematic distinction between cogito and
cogitatum - a distinction which cannot be said to apply to the mode
of readiness-to-hand without assuming precisely that presence at hand
is philosophically prior to readiness-to-hand.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---