Re: Philosophers: Dead or Alive?

Jim wrote:

>jim:
>So, in the above quotation you did not mean to refer to "textual works"
particularly?<

That is exactly right Jim.  Philosophy as I am presenting it,  is primari=
ly
about a self-referential practice and not primarily about the expression =
of
views.

> You don't mean the non-textual works as exhibited in their
>daily life, do you, like Socrates' views about women (as that view is
>suggested by Plato's written work), or Locke's, Hume's, and Kant's
>blatantly racist views, or some 'living' philosophers' non-textual views=

as
>expressed in their membership to the National Party here in the UK?  <

As said, philosophy is not about the expression of views, ideas, opinions=
,
beliefs, etc., but the practice of thought, language, etc., first and
foremost.  This alters the place that views, etc., have for philosophical=

work and bandied about in daily life.

>>Daniel:
>>  I am sure Plato, Xenophon and
>>so on would not agree that he did not produce any philosophical work.
>jim:
>(An appeal to authority, but ...) That is not what I'm contending. Your
>comment suggested to me, that you were referring to 'texts' whose
>'authorship' is attributed to a person.<

No, and even though I phrase it in the most non-technical way I can, it i=
s
easily misunderstood.  What I was arguing was that what was carried on fr=
om
Socrates was not his views at all, but his way of doing philosophy.  And
that is what is passed down through the centuries and what philosophers w=
ho
follow and practise this way find in Socrates.   What Plato or Xenophon, =
or
Aristotle make of the views, requires placing in the perspective set by
philosophy as the practice of dialogue.    It is this way of doing
philosophy which is perpetuated in the dramatic dialogue form of Plato an=
d
not in Xenophon.   Originally  in early Aristotle and then in a different=

kind of dialogical practice in later Aristotle.

>jim:
>This is not an ad hominem attack. Although what you have written
>suggests so, i do not think that you would put forward this 'standard' a=
s
>one that must be met to be worthy of being called 'a philosopher.' <

Yes Jim, it reads as an ad hominem attack if it uses the name of Nietzsch=
e
without a single argument for why Socrates reasoned he must follow the la=
w,
as argued in the Meno.  =


>does not =

>your comments read like
>the stuff one reads on the back covers of popularizing, paperback
>publications of introductory philosophy texts. Eg, "Through his own
>critical acumen and lively exercise of the Elenchos, Prof Jones brings
>Socrates back to life in our present-day arena of philosophical debate.
>Engage with Socrates yourself as you weigh the great perennial
>philosophical questions."
>I would still maintain this assessment of your written claims about
'philosophy'.<

Again Jim.    You are still missing what is being said, even though it is=

framed in the simplest of forms.   What is transmitted are philosophical
ways and not philosophical views or questions.   To carry on the spirit o=
f
a philosophy is to carry on in its way, which is not only the  way of
Socrates, but that of philosophy as practised by him.   NOT to carry on h=
is
views.  And that is the central point about reading Heidegger.  For one i=
s
not a Heideggerean by sharing his views, but practising thought, and then=

in doing so, one cannot be Heideggerean.   But 'Heideggereans' seem to ho=
ld
that there are set things which you must hold with Heidegger, set views
about things.   But this is to enter into dogmatics rather than philosoph=
y,
into exegesis rather than the art of thought.   To learn the art of thoug=
ht
is to learn its ways and to learn from Heidegger is to learn  ways and no=
t =

thoughts or views.    And to do so then  is to do philosophy in the same
spirit that he did it.  But those who hold that it is agreeing with him
over a range of issues, are not following in that spirit.

>>Daniel: =

>>His [Socrates'] spirit is
>>absent from his body but present to all those who practise this way of
>>questioning philosophically.

>jim:
>What you have written in the sentence immediately above, is incredibly
>bewitching; it makes philosophy seem like some mystical occult
>practice.
>
>I would still hold this claim concerning your comment about Soc's 'spiri=
t'
>being 'absent from his body', etc. Doesn't that seem occult to you?<

Do you see how I must be bemused by now?   A way of doing philosophy, in
the way that Socrates did, say, (no place to argue the sources on Socrate=
s)
is something that Socrates becomes indebted to, identifies himself with,
and something Plato may take up, and continue to this day, although few a=
nd
far between, is quite  distinct from the person Socrates, although
intrinsic to the philosopher Socrates.  But to practise that same way
(supposing that it is so) one identifies with Socrates and the spirit
within which he practised philosophy.   Looking at things this way is a w=
ay
of  avoiding the metaphysical use of technical terms like 'spirit' and
'body', (or rather to begin their deconstruction),  but returns them to
their 'natural' habitat, in which they make perfect, and yet everyday
sense.

> It
>certainly does to me and it would seem so, I venture, to person's with
>'philosophical ears', as you put it.
>
>My responses to your claims arise from the question:
>To whom are such utterances directed? To whom could these
>utterances be 'telling'?
>I'm not claiming that they cannot be 'telling'. Rather, I'm asking for
>Whom could they be -- asking about the nature of the audience you are
>addressing: students in an introductory course, academic practitioners,<=


Aimed at anyone who can hear on this issue of man and philosophy.   My
argument in those simple expressions, in that the philosopher is really
interested in engaging with the way philosophy is done rather than the ma=
n
behind it.  Although by putting it in this form leads to a whole differen=
t
way of understanding the relation of the man to the way of practice.   I =
do
know that when you put things in simple, non-technical form that there is=
 a
tendency to think that nothing is really being said.   It is easier to
think something is being said if there is a range of technical expression=
s
in each proposition.   But for me, this undermines philosophical practice=

and plays into the hands of scholars for whom this is bread an butter.   =

But the point draws attention to the distinction between philosophy as a
way of thinking  to be practised  rather than philosophy as the search fo=
r
theory which can then be applied practically.   It >is this way of seeing=

philosophy which leads to the view that Heidegger's theory must be put in=

context and this has to be an historical one.  Such is the view I think
expressed by Rockmore when he says such things like, 'I am convinced that=

Heidegger's theory reflects a variety of contemperary influences, some of=

which he may not  have been fully aware of, ' But earlier, 'The supposed
distinction between Heidegger and his thought obviously reflects a
dseparation of theory from practice, ' (Tom Rockmore, 'On Heidegger's
Nazism and Philosophy,' (p 8 and then 6)   And so he goes on to argue tha=
t
an account of the man Heidegger is necessary to understanding the
philosopher.

>...? That was the point of my suggestion -- perhaps, rudely worded, that=

>your comments were posted to the wrong list.
>To be more specific, consider the following quote, for example:

>"Let us suppose, then, that we are now asleep, and that all these
>particulars, namely, that we open our eyes, move our heads, hold out
>our hands, and such like actions, are only false illusions; and let us
think
>that perhaps our hands and all our body are not as we see them."

>Who is this comment addressing? My point is not that this was
>fabricated in monologue. But we can envisage these comments as very
>appropriately uttered in the context of a magician's show, or as spoken
>by a hypnotist, a Rasputin, or a Houdini, .... They are extremeley
>obtuse; outrageous from within the purview of the everyday, or at least
>outside the confines of a 'kind of show'. But who were the utterances'
>intended audience? For these comments to even be a 'philosophical
>telling', we (in some sense) 'already' have to have 'severed' ourselves
>from our bodies, if you will. (I try to 'read' Heidegger as asking and
>providing one answer to the question 'how is such an audience
>possible?' When these comments are 'telling'/'speak to us' -- as the
>tradition is for us/does to us -- we become accomplices, as it were, in =
a
>misconstrual of the kind of creature that we are ...).
>That was the concern behind my question: To whom were you trying to
>'tell' something?
>jim

I think you are still thinking in terms of philosophy trying to pass on a=

view, the content of something said.  This certainly does happen within
philosophyas part of its practice, , but I do not think that it is what
philosophy primarily does.   For this, is to show a way, and when the way=

is seen others with their practices are taken by it.  It is with  the way=

they become fascinated and which they seek to practise and not a view, or=
 a
meaning.    It is the way, the how, that brings you up short.   Not that
you have to believe for a minute what has been said.   And I suspect this=

is part of why so many who read Heidegger go on then to talk like he did
imitatively, because they have been struck by the manner first, but then
mistakenly think that if you talk like this you will then be doing what
Heidegger did.  But this is to confuse his style with thought as the way =
to
be and to practise.   Propositions with strings of Heideggerean fundament=
al
terms do not remind me of Heidegger but of Woody Allen on a good day.

I paste in the quotes below and I think if you look carefully you will se=
e
that this is exactly what I did say.

Thankyou Jim.  The civility appreciated,

Daniel


Message text written by INTERNET:heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Daniel, I have re-included your comments to which I was responding:
Daniel wrote:
>>Philosophy is not discourse with the dead but the living.  Through
>>their work we are in active dialogue with philosophers, their active
>>thinking, active upon us and receptive to our own working positions.
>>The spirit of Socrates e.g. is alive, and kept alive through us living
>>and having dialogue in the spirit in which Socrates practised it.
jim wrote:
>That is hilarious! (besides, bad example, Socs didn't produce any
>'works').<
Daniel:
>Did not produce any textual works you mean.     --- from list
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<


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