From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 13:00:55 -0600
Michael Eldred wrote:
> > Yes, but at 1064b11-14, Aristotle specifically says that the status
> > of metaphysics as a science *distinct in itself from physics*
> > specifically depends on the discovery of an immobile being.
> Aristotle cannot say that, because he does not have the word
> "metaphysics". What you are identifying with metaphysics is only half
> of it: _epist=EAm=EA the=F4logik=EA_.
But it is that half which Aristotle specifically states makes it a
distinct *science.* I realize that part of the essential subject matter
of metaphysics is the analysis of being qua being, as opposed to the
analysis of immobile beings, but Aristotle specifically states in the
above text that it is the latter which makes it *science,* since he says
that without an immobile being, there simply would be no science beyond
physics. So what I am saying is not based on some mere definition or
truncated reading; rather, it is what Aristotle explicitly states in the
> > Thus,
> > the analysis of the being of causality or of being qua being alone
> > is not enough to form a distinct science at all.
> I have not claimed any "alone" at any point in this discussion, only
> that metaphysics is a science of beings insofar as they are beings.
You had argued that the modern notion of science or essential knowledge
may be contrasted against Aristotle's in that the latter considers the
very being of causality, or the very being of beings (in the case of the
science of metaphysics). I am countering that this cannot be the point
of contrast between modern science and Aristotelian science because
Aristotle himself explicitly states that what makes the science of being
qua being a distinct *science* is not the consideration of the being of
beings, but specifically the discovery of immobile beings. That is
simply what Aristotle explicitly states in the text I cite.
> Regarding the dual onto-theological character of metaphysics Heidegger
> writes in "Identitaet und Differenz": "Die Metaphysik denkt das Sein
> des Seienden sowohl in der ergruendenden Einheit des Allgemeinsten,
> d.h. des ueberall Gleich-Gueltigen, als auch in der begruendenden
> Einheit der Allheit, d.h. des Hoechsten ueber allem." (S.55)
> "Metaphysics thinks the being of beings in fathoming the unity of what
> is most universal, i.e. ubiquitously valid and in-different, as well
> as in grounding the unity of everything in what is the highest being
> above all others."
> This dual character of metaphysics is apparent in Aristotle's
> metaphysics to any non-lopsided reading.
Again, I agree that metaphysics has that dual character, but the issue
here is specifically which part makes it *science* or *essential
knowledge,* since you were trying to contrast the modern notion of
science against Aristotle's.
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