From: Malcolm Riddoch <riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 25 May 1999 19:50:10 +0800
>The "my" of "my lectern" is a way of looking at the world, not a claim
>of ownership. "Man" is just a different way of looking at the world,
>not a someone.
>If this is true sociological terms like "elitism" are beside the point -
>as are discussions about "Man" as a sociological category. And that
>is the point I wanted to make.
yep, that was his lectern...and he was a man...but are you saying that
fearful fleeing isn't then an existential structure belonging to das Man,
the one which we all are together? I don't think Heidegger's claiming a
merely sociological status here for in/authenticity. Quite the contrary, he
is arguing that these are essential structures for all human being, and
that his own joyfully defamiliarizing angst in the face of death is also
not merely a 'world view' but gives a privileged properly philosophical
access to the temporal structure of life as such. You seem to want to have
your cake and eat it too....and I still don't see why arguing about the
existential structure of angst and its being towards death are merely
sociological on the one hand cos they are just Heidegger the Man's personal
point of view, and yet philosophical on the other hand cos this particular'
Man' was the "thinker who becomes aware of Being".
And I definitely can't see why this should mean that we can't question his
apparently 'sociological' depiction of the they self and angst and confine
ourselves to questioning...what? Being qua being? Or is it all just
sociology...a philosophical anthropology like Husserl thought?
>If Mulhall's view on _Sein und Zeit_ is correct, Heidegger is "Man",
>who does not know Being, AND he is. He shows us two possible ways of
>looking at the
>world - and makes a case for the latter one (although not at the
>expense of the former).
So das Man is Heidegger's own relation to das Man, and it's a
preontological understanding of this preontological relation? So das Man is
here explicitly Heidegger's own personal view, it has no transcendental
status, it's merely a sociological description of his own life...which is
what I was arguing anyways as regards the existential status of 'fearful
fleeing'. So we sort of agree here. But does this mean Heidegger's whole
description of inauthenticity is just sociology for Mulhall?
And in which cases do you see the "case for the latter" applying? Does
Heidegger the thinker of being only emerge in his case for authenticity,
but not its anxious method, rather, only where the existential structure of
care is concerned? And who makes these sociological/philosophical
distinctions? Heidegger definitely makes them as far as distinguishing
between the merely ontic and the ontological.
Of course, Mulhall's view as you put it is just one way of reading BT,
another way might be to take BT at face value and accept that Heidegger
does intend to describe the transcendental structures of human existence in
general...that is probably _the_ major claim of BT after all...that it is
not merely a sociological description but a fundamental ontology of Dasein.
And I think from this philosophical perspective it is entirely appropriate
to question whether or not fearful fleeing is necessary to the existential
analytic...and whether authentic angst as early Heidegger envisions it is
an appropriate way of disclosing the temporality of Dasein. It is from this
perspective, and following Dreyfus' criticisms of BT, that I've posited my
questions re existential death.
But tell me, do you get into making the world strange? When you face death
as an ontological possibility are you swept into an ecstasis of joyful
angst in an impassioned and radically individuated freedom towards death?
And when you do this do you need to see the others as a fearfully fleeing
mass of tranquilized non-individuated individuals?
I don't buy the reactionary herd thing over against the radically
individuated ecstatic philosopher...but it's just a question of emphasis
for me. People _are_ generally reticent about death, and philosophy _does_
offer different and uncommon ways of understanding the world. What do you
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