Malcolm Riddoch wrote:
> Thus,
> for Husserl, the universal epoche purifies data of "all
> interpretations that are read into them more than is genuinely
> seen" - namely, not questioning the existence of the world. This
>applies to both daily mundane living and to the naive scientific
>attitude. Heidegger's "unpurified data," on the other
> hand, is precisely Dasein as immersed in everyday living and
> dealing. For Heidegger, it is precisely the treatment of daily
> mundane immersion as "prejudiced" which indicates the underlying
> bias of western philosophy before him.
>
> Anthony Crifasi
>
>I dunno, for Heidegger inauthenticity is prejudiced, it has a common
>conception of time, a self-evident meaning of being, a 'superior
>indifference to death' - and these metaphysical prejudices must be
>deconstructed just as in Husserl to arrive at their ontological
>foundations in temporality. For Husserl it's still 'lived experience'
>that's in question, and what else is there for any philosophy,
>including Heidegger's?
The difference is that for Husserl, *immersed* lived experience is
prejudiced and must therefore be purified of those prejudices through the
universal epoche before it can serve as pure data for phenomenological
analysis, whereas for Heidegger, it is precisely *immersed* lived experience
which is the pure data. So the difference is a fundamental one, since the
dispute is about what the data under analysis should be - *immersed* lived
experience or reduced lived experience. This causes fundamental differences
- for example, for Husserl, the I is phenomenologically prior to the They
(ie, he explains our experience of the Other in the Fifth Meditation in
terms of the transcendental ego in the first four Meditations), whereas for
Heidegger, the They is phenomenologically prior to the I (since in
*immersed* lived experience, there is no distinction between I and They).
>I'm not saying that Husserl has it all worked out though, his phenomenology
>is very broad and is very much a voyage of discovery,
>setting up new methods and ways of approaching old problems. Heidegger
>is much more focused, much more systematic and organizes his whole
>approach around one simple question concerning the meaning of being,
>yet I think he definitely builds on the grounds that Husserl laid, and
>Heidegger says as much right up to his later years. Have you ever
>wondered how this could be possible if at every turn Husserl's
>phenomenology is seen merely as a naive cartesian error? Where are the
>similarities between these two thinkers, especially if Husserl is so
>often cited as a fundamental influence?
The similarity is the method of phenomenological analysis (ie, finding the
phenomenological basis of the phenonema, as opposed to a "causal" or
metaphysical basis). In that way, Husserl was the father of phenomenology,
and a fundamental influence for Heidegger. The difference between them lies
in what the "pure data" should be (immersed or reduced lived experience),
which is a fundamental difference.
Anthony Crifasi
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