In addition, civil libertarians are alarmed by the idea of spies
casually passing sensitive information around from one agency to
another. “I don’t want the N.S.A. passing on information about innocent
Americans to local cops in San Diego,” Weinberger said. “Those laws
exist for good reasons.”
In many ways, the new generation of Web-savvy spies frames the same
troubling questions as the Patriot Act, which sought to break down the
barriers preventing military spy agencies from conducting operations
inside the United States, on American citizens, and then sharing that
information with domestic groups. On a sheerly practical level, it makes
sense to get rid of all barriers: why not let the N.S.A. wiretap
American conversations? Vice President Cheney has argued forcefully that
these historical barriers between agencies hobble the American military
and intelligence forces; the Patriot Act was designed in part to
eliminate them. Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda heed no such boundaries,
which is precisely why they can move so quickly and nimbly.
Then again, there’s a limit to how much the United States ought to
emulate Al Qaeda’s modus operandi. “The problems the spies face are
serious; I sympathize with that,” Shirky told me. “But they shouldn’t be
wiping up every bit of information about every American citizen.” The
Pentagon’s infamous Total Information Awareness program, which came to
light in 2002, was intended to scoop up information on citizens from a
variety of sources — commercial purchase databases, government records —
and mine it for suggestive terrorism connections. But to many Americans,
this sort of dot-connecting activity seemed like an outrageous violation
of privacy, and soon after it was exposed, the program was killed. James
X. Dempsey, director of the Center for Democracy and Technology,
maintains that the laws on spying and privacy need new clarity. The
historic morass of legislation, including the Patriot Act, has become
too confusing, he says; both spies and the public are unsure what walls
exist. While Dempsey agrees that agencies should probably be allowed to
swap more information than they currently do, he says that revamped
rules must also respect privacy — “otherwise, we’ll keep on producing
programs that violate people’s sense of what’s right, and they’ll keep
getting shut down.”
For all the complaints about hardware, the challenges are only in part
about technology. They are also about political will and institutional
culture — and whether the spy agencies can be persuaded to change. Some
former intelligence officials have expressed skepticism about whether
Meyerrose and Fingar and their national-intelligence colleagues have the
clout and power to persuade the agencies to adopt this new paradigm.
Though D.N.I. officials say they have direct procurement authority over
technology for all the agencies, there’s no evidence yet that Meyerrose
will be able to make a serious impact on the eight spy agencies in the
Department of Defense, which has its own annual $38 billion intelligence
budget — the lion’s share of all the money the government spends on
spying. When I spoke to Wilson P. Dizard III, a writer with Government
Computer News who has covered federal technology issues for two decades,
he said, “You have all these little barons at N.S.A. and C.I.A. and
whatever, and a lot of people think they’re not going to do what the
D.N.I. says, if push comes to shove.”
Today’s spies exist in an age of constant information exchange, in which
everyday citizens swap news, dial up satellite pictures of their houses
and collaborate on distant Web sites with strangers. As John Arquilla
told me, if the spies do not join the rest of the world, they risk
growing to resemble the rigid, unchanging bureaucracy that they once
confronted during the cold war. “Fifteen years ago we were fighting the
Soviet Union,” he said. “Who knew it would be replicated today in the
intelligence community?”
cont'd....
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/magazine/03intelligence.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
